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Choosing Justices: How Presidents Decide
ABSTRACT

Presidents play the critical role in determining who will serve as justices on the Supreme
Court and their decisions inevitably influence constitutional doctrine and judicial behavior long
after their terms have ended. Notwithstanding the impact of these selections, scholars have
focused relatively little attention on how presidents decide who to nominate. This article
contributes to the literature in the area by advancing three arguments. First, it adopts an
intermediate course between the works which tend to treat the subject historically without
identifying recurring patterns and those which try to reduce the process to empirical formulas
which inevitably obscure considerations shaping decision. The article argues that a more
analytically useful approach views the selection as turning upon the interaction of three
variables—pool, context and presidential idiosyncrasy—each of which consists of a variety of
other factors. This article examines Supreme Court nominations since 1900 to develop these
points. Use of that period illustrates the taxonomy described above yet it also exposes the
dynamic nature of the process which leads to the article’s second mission. It explains how larger
changes in other governmental institutions and in society have transformed the process by which
presidents choose Court nominees. Those changes occurred independent of any formal
constitutional amendment, thereby offering a case study in how constitutional institutions evolve
in response to informal developments. Finally, the article argues that the changes in the process
have increased the likelihood that presidents will nominate competent justices but lessens the
prospects that they will choose potentially great jurists.
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Choosing Justices: How Presidents Decide
Presidents of the United States play the critical role in determining who serves on the
Supreme Court. Although the Constitution subjects these presidential nominations to the advice
and consent process, the Senate’s role, though important, is reactive and secondary. Only the
president can nominate and that power confers a huge advantage in composing the Court.1
Presidential nominees to the Court almost always win confirmation. Since 1900, about 87% of
those selected as nominees for the Court were confirmed.2 This high rate of presidential success
does not mean that a president has carte blanche in choosing a nominee. As will be shown
below, the success rate traces in part to presidential skill in choosing confirmable candidates.
Nonetheless, the figures confirm that the Court’s composition correlates closely to decisions
presidents make regarding who to nominate.
The impact of those presidential decisions reverberates for generations. Those chosen
generally remain on the Court well beyond the term (and often the life) of their benefactor.
Justices William Brennan and Byron “Whizzer” White, for instance, served during the tenures of
eight presidents; Justice (and Chief Justice) William Rehnquist overlapped seven.
These two factors, the president’s dominance of Supreme Court selection and the lengthy
service of those he chooses, interact with a third variable to compound the significance of the
subject. The Court’s position atop the judicial hierarchy affords its nine members extraordinary
1

Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 671 (2003) (emphasizing institutional
strength of president’s position); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating the New Politics of Judicial
Appointments, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1869, 1872 (2008) (same).
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Arguably the rate is even higher since the nine unsuccessful nominees include John Roberts who was initially
nominated to replace Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a nomination which was withdrawn so he could be nominated
as chief justice. The success rate was lower in earlier periods. Over the course of American history it is
approximately 78%.
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influence on the shape of American law. Each justice wields a portion of the judicial power to
check the work of the other branches of the national government as well as that of other units in
the federal system.
For these reasons, few presidential decisions, regarding personnel especially, rival
Supreme Court nominations in their enduring consequences. Many presidents have suggested as
much in their public pronouncements. Although much has been written regarding the
deficiencies of the Senate’s confirmation process,3 relatively little scholarly attention has
explored how presidents make these decisions. That neglect leaves a gap not only in the
literature on the presidency but also in that regarding the Court, its composition and the shape of
American law, particularly constitutional law. Ultimately the content and quality of judicial
doctrine turns on the identity, competency and dispositions of the justices on the Court, and those
characteristics are largely determined by decisions of the appointing presidents acting
individually at different times.
Although these presidential decisions clearly have a major impact on American law as
well as on governmental institutions, knowledge regarding them is relatively rudimentary.
Supreme Court nominations are sui generis in two respects. They are materially different from
selections a president makes for other offices. The pattern of a president’s other decisions, even
regarding personnel, does not forecast his Supreme Court nominees. Moreover, each Court
nomination differs from every other one. For reasons explained below, different presidents
choose differently and any one president is likely to act differently in filling Court vacancies
which arise on his watch.
3

See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994);
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2007).

2

These distinctive characteristics of presidential selection of Supreme Court nominees
present a paradox. The uniqueness of these decisions mandate separate consideration of the
topic, especially given its vital importance to American law and government. It is essential to
focus on presidential choice to understand why those who interpret law on the Court achieved
their exalted positions. Yet the varying nature of presidential behavior suggests that such an
examination will not yield reliable formulas to explain the past or predict the future.
Although the topic resists algorithmic precision, the enterprise lends itself to some
systematic discussion provided, at least, that some play is built into the joints. The effort to
formulate rules to predict presidential choice represents a futile quest, yet studying the dynamics
of the selection of justices allows generalizations which contribute to understanding of
presidential behavior in this area and of the Court it produces.
The thesis of this article comes in three-parts. First, it argues that Supreme Court
selection is too diverse to lend itself to formulaic treatment yet sufficiently regular to suggest
recurring patterns. Most of the article is dedicated to providing a taxonomy of Supreme Court
selection. More specifically, it argues that Supreme Court nominations are best understood as
the product of the interaction between three interrelated and dynamic variables—the pool of
potential candidates, the context in which the nomination is made, and presidential idiosyncrasy.
The factors are interrelated because the pool from which a president chooses depends on the
context surrounding the choice and the general criteria and dispositions of the president and
those he involves in the search. Although certain patterns recur, Supreme Court nominations are
each distinctive choices. The pool, context and selector differ from one presidency to the next.
Indeed the pool and context vary within a single presidency, and a president making later
nominations has generally learned from experiences and accordingly is not quite the same person
3

who made the earlier choices. Perceived political and ideological compatibility helps narrow the
pool4 yet presidents do not simply choose the candidate they think best reflects their ideology
subject to concessions made to find a confirmable choice as some suggest.5 Presidential behavior
here is subject to multi-factored influences and cannot be reduced to any such formulaic
approach. The enterprise is more a matter of serendipity than of science.
But the history of past presidential nominations must be carefully used. It can furnish
insights but can also lead us badly astray. This observation leads to the second point. Presidents
today act within a different system than did their predecessors, even their recent predecessors,
even though the relevant constitutional arrangements have presented the same formal features
since the founding. Even though no amendment has addressed the president’s constitutional role
in choosing Supreme Court nominees, the system in which presidents now operate has evolved
due to the unanticipated consequences of formal and informal developments. The article suggests
that presidential choice, and accordingly Court composition, cannot be understood without
recognizing the dynamic quality of a seemingly static system. The system which now exists is,
in some respects, quite different from that of even recent times. Like Theodore Roosevelt,
Franklin Roosevelt and Richard Nixon, Barack Obama’s choices were the product of the
interaction between his options, the circumstances in which the decisions were made and
presidential personality. Yet Obama operated in a system that was somewhat different than these
and most other twentieth century presidents.

4

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS
FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 3 (5th ed. 2008).

5

Cf. CHRISTINE NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
FROM HERBERT HOOVER THROUGH GEORGE W. BUSH 111, 127–28 (2007) (arguing that presidents who believe
themselves freed of confirmation constraints select nominee from pool who is most ideologically compatible).
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Finally, these systemic changes have important consequence for the quality and
characteristics of those nominated to serve on the Court. Their impact on Court nominations is
mixed. The changes surrounding the process increase the likelihood that presidents will choose
competent nominees for the Court yet they reduce the likelihood they will select those whose
past service distinguishes them as courageous leaders likely to move the law in constructive
directions.
The article proceeds as follows. Section I develops some of the premises stated above
and presents a general outline of the landscape in which presidents have made Supreme Court
nominations since 1900. That cutoff date, though somewhat arbitrary, focuses on the most
recent half of American history and furnishes a sufficiently large sample from which to discern
patterns. As explained below, the data from that period is subject to different use in developing
the three parts of the thesis outlined above. Sections II through V develop a general taxonomy of
presidential decision. In particular, section II identifies characteristics about the pool of
nominees. Section III describes how contextual factors have affected selection. Section IV
demonstrates the role of presidential idiosyncrasy in making selections. Section V discusses the
interaction of these factors and argues that efforts to produce a more formulaic account should be
regarded skeptically. For purposes of developing the taxonomy, the three variables accurately
portray presidential decision during the entire period even though some changes in American
government and politics since 1900 render some of the specific practices or considerations from
earlier years less relevant now. Section VI draws from the data to explore developments during
the period which produced enduring change rather than simply short-term fluctuations. This
section presents a more particular portrait of the current system and illustrates how it is a product
of changes in other institutions and in society more generally. Section VII offers some
5

observations on the implications of these changes for the quality and characteristics of those who
now become justices.
I.

A General Survey of the Landscape
A. The Significance of the Decision

The significance of Supreme Court nominations traces to the justices’ role atop one of the
three branches of America’s national government, the scarcity of their number, and their life
tenure.6 Presidents have recognized the importance of their Supreme Court nominees.7
President Ronald Reagan put it well when he said, “Those who sit in the Supreme Court interpret
the laws of our land and truly do leave their footprints on the sands of time. Long after the

6

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (conferring life-tenure on judges of Supreme Court).

7

See, e.g., Address to the Nation Announcing Intention to Nominate Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist
to Be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, PUB. PAPERS 1052 (October 21, 1971) (Nixon
labeling Supreme Court nominations as “[b]y far the most important appointments” a President makes); Remarks
Announcing Intention to Nominate John Paul Stevens to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, PUB. PAPERS
1917(November 28, 1975) (“The nomination of a Justice of the United States Supreme Court is one of the most
important decisions a President has to make.”); Remarks Announcing the Intention to Nominate Sandra Day
O'Connor to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, PUB. PAPERS 596 (July 7, 1981)
(Ronald Reagan describing Court nominations as “the most awesome appointment” a President makes); Remarks
Announcing the Nomination of David H. Souter to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters, PUB. PAPERS 1046–47 (July 23, 1990) (“ Few duties are
more important in discharging that obligation than my responsibility, under article II, section 2 of our Constitution,
to select from among all possible choices one nominee to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court of the United
States.”); Remarks at a Republican Party Fundraising Luncheon in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, PUB. PAPERS 1054
(July 24, 1990) (“So, the appointment of a Supreme Court Justice becomes one of the most serious responsibilities
facing any President.”); Exchange with Reporters in Atlanta, PUB. PAPERS 325(March 19, 1993) (Bill Clinton said
“that there are few decisions the President makes which are more weighty, more significant, or can have a greater
impact on more Americans than an appointment to the Supreme Court.”); see also The President's News
Conference, PUB. PAPERS 798 (July 28, 1965) (In announcing Fortas’ nomination, Johnson proclaimed that “[t]he
President has few responsibilities of greater importance or greater consequence to the country's future than the
constitutional responsibility of nominating Justices for the Supreme Court of the United States.” The Fortas
nomination was the third item at his press conference, following a long defense of his Vietnam policy including the
explanation of why Johnson was sending 50,000 more troops to Vietnam and raising the monthly draft call from
17,000/month to 35,000/month and the appointment of NBC newsman John Chancellor to direct Voice of America).
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policies of Presidents and Senators and Congressmen of any given era may have passed from
public memory, they'll be remembered.”8
Most presidents make few Supreme Court nominations. Since 1900, the 20 presidents
have nominated 68 persons9 for the Supreme Court. Individual presidents have nominated
anywhere from zero (Jimmy Carter)10 to nine (Franklin D. Roosevelt) potential justices. On 59
occasions, the nominee was confirmed and took office.11 The average number of Court
nominations per president over the period is 3.4; the average number of seats filled, 2.9.
As suggested above, the distribution of nominations per president is uneven. Eight presidents
made two or fewer nominations12 and two made only three nominations.13 Only two
presidents—Taft and Nixon—nominated more than one justice/year. Accordingly, more data
8

Remarks Announcing the Intention to Nominate Sandra Day O'Connor to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, PUB. PAPERS 596 (July 7, 1981). See also Remarks on the Nomination of Sonia
Sotomayor to Be a Supreme Court Associate Justice _ PUB. PAPERS _ (May 26, 2009) (forthcoming [month] [year]),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=86204&st=sotomayor&st1=(President (“Of the
many responsibilities granted to a President by our Constitution, few are more serious or more consequential than
selecting a Supreme Court Justice. The members of our highest court are granted life tenure, often serving long after
the Presidents who appointed them, and they are charged with the vital task of applying principles put to paper more
than 20 [2; White House correction] centuries ago to some of the most difficult questions of our time.”).
9

This number counts only once, Justices Butler and Harlan, each of whom were nominated twice for the same seat,
but counts John Roberts, who was nominated for two different vacancies, twice. It also includes Judge Douglas
Ginsburg who President Reagan announced as his nominee but whose name was never formally submitted.
10

President William McKinley nominated none during the twentieth century but one (Joseph McKenna) in 1897
who is not included in this study.

11

The nine nominees who did not take office were Judge John Parker (Senate rejected), Justice Abe Fortas (Senate
filibustered; nomination withdrawn), Judge Homer Thornberry (no Senate action since nomination contingent on
Fortas elevation), Judge Clement Haynsworth (Senate rejected), Judge G. Harold Carswell (Senate rejected), Judge
Robert Bork (Senate rejected), Judge Douglas Ginsburg (intent to nominate announced but name not submitted once
Ginsburg withdrew), Judge John Roberts for O’Connor seat (nomination withdrawn and resubmitted for Chief
Justice), and Harriet Miers (nomination withdrawn).

12

McKinley, Coolidge, Kennedy, Ford, Carter, Bush (41), Clinton, Obama.

13

Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson.
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exists for some presidents, and relatively little exists for most. The uneven distribution may
overemphasize the approaches of presidents who made multiple nominations and undervalue
those of chief executives who made few selections.
Table A Supreme Court Nominations Per President
Number of Nominations

Presidents

0

McKinley, Carter

1

Coolidge, Ford

2

Kennedy, Bush (41), Clinton, Obama

3

T. Roosevelt, Wilson

4

Harding, Hoover, Truman, Johnson, Bush (43)

5

Eisenhower

6

Taft, Nixon, Reagan

7

None

8

None

9

F. Roosevelt

Some presidents who had relatively short tenures filled more vacancies than others who
served longer periods. For instance, Woodrow Wilson, who completed two full terms and
Theodore Roosevelt who almost did, each filled three Court vacancies. The intervening
president, William Howard Taft, served half as long but appointed twice as many justices.
Warren Harding made four appointments in less than 2 ½ years and Herbert Hoover made four
nominations in one term, whereas the intermediate president, Calvin Coolidge, served 5 ½ years

8

yet had only one opening. Since justices hold office during “good behavior,”14 their service ends
at unpredictable times. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush each served eight years yet Clinton’s
two vacancies occurred within a year early in his first term whereas Bush’s came within a few
months at the beginning of his second. The irregularity of vacancies further varies the context
each president faces.
Although it is tempting to attribute the fact that Franklin Roosevelt filled nine vacancies
to the unprecedented length of his presidency (he was elected four times and served more than 12
years), all nine vacancies came within less than a 5 ½ year period from June 2, 1937 (when
Justice Willis Van Devanter retired) and October 2, 1942 (when Justice James Byrnes resigned).
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Coolidge, Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, Clinton
and Bush (43) served longer than that period yet were presented with between one (Coolidge)
and five (Eisenhower) vacancies.
Two other factors have influenced the number of nominations some presidents made.
Presidents who make unsuccessful nominations have the opportunity to choose multiple
candidates for a vacancy (unless the failed nominations come at the end of a presidential term as
was the case with Johnson’s ill-fated selections of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry). Hoover
made two nominations to fill the vacancy which the death of Justice Edward Sanford in 1930
produced, Nixon made three nominations to succeed Fortas, Reagan chose three men to replace
Lewis Powell, and Bush (43) made three to follow Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, although one

14

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.”).

9

of those, that of then Judge John Roberts, was withdrawn to be resubmitted to fill the vacancy
the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist created.
Presidents occasionally engineer vacancies in three ways. Five times since 1900, a
president has nominated an associate justice, or one nominated for that position, to be chief
justice, thereby creating another selection opportunity.15 Two presidents persuaded a justice to
leave the Court to accept an executive branch position.16 On two occasions, presidents created
conditions which encouraged justices to resign. Johnson’s nomination of Ramsay Clark as
Attorney General induced Clark’s father, Justice Tom Clark, to resign to avoid conflicts of
interest, thereby creating the vacancy Johnson used to nominate Thurgood Marshall to the Court.
Nixon pressured Fortas to resign by having the justice department initiate criminal investigations
against him, his wife and other close associates with the implicit suggestion that his resignation
would end the inquiries.17
B. The Uniqueness of the Decision

15

The five instances involved the elevations of Justices Edward White (1910), Harlan Fiske Stone (1941), and
Rehnquist (1986) to Chief Justice, the attempted elevation of Fortas (1968) and the withdrawal of Roberts as the
nominee to replace Justice O’Connor and submission of his name to replace Rehnquist (2005).
16
Franklin D. Roosevelt prevailed on Jimmy Byrnes to leave the Court in 1942 to head the Office of Economic
Stabilization and Johnson persuaded Arthur Goldberg to leave the Court to become Ambassador to the United
Nations. ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND HIS TIMES, 1961-1973, 234 (1998); LAURA
KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 241 (1990); Interview by Ted Gittinger with Arthur Goldberg 1–2 (March 23,
1983) (transcript available at LBJ Library Oral History Project
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/GoldbergA/goldberg.asp). Goldberg claimed
Johnson had previously asked him to be Attorney General and that Johnson aides had raised the possibility of his
serving as secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Ultimately, Johnson appealed to Goldberg’s vanity and may
have suggested that the rode to the vice presidency ran through the United Nations, not the Court. In addition, Harry
S. Truman offered Justice William O. Douglas the vice-presidential nomination in 1948 and appointment as
Secretary of Interior in 1941; Douglas declined each time.
17

JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED
4–11 (2001).

THE SUPREME COURT
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In addition to occurring infrequently, Supreme Court nominations are unique. Presidents
have reason to view them quite differently than any other personnel decisions they make.
Of course, presidents nominate other judges but the surrounding circumstances are
entirely different. Unlike appointments to the lower federal courts, Supreme Court nominations
are rare, highly visible and made without the expectation that politicians from particular states
are entitled to influence. Presidents become more involved in selecting nominees for the Court
than for other judicial positions.18 Virtually all lower federal court judges will toil far from the
national spotlight. The work of a justice is much more conspicuous. Decisions of a lower court
judge will rarely, if ever, impact administration objectives; the Court’s work has far greater and
more regular consequence. Although legal competence is a relevant consideration for any
judicial nomination, the level of distinction sought is higher, the scrutiny is greater and the
requisite skills are different for the Court than for virtually all lower court nominations.
Skill as a jurist and knowledge of the law are not criteria for most other presidential
appointments. Other material differences exist, too. Unlike cabinet selections, a Supreme Court
nominee serves in the judicial, not executive, branch, and accordingly the Constitution dictates
an entirely different president-justice relationship from that of president-cabinet member. A
cabinet member is the president’s subordinate who is largely subject to presidential control and
removal, a relationship which flows from constitutional text19 and precedent. The latter
exercises power in a separate institution which serves, in part, to check executive behavior. The
constitutional difference carries other implications. The senate has greater reason to defer to the
president in choosing those who will help discharge his responsibility than in selecting justices
18

NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, SOME OF IT WAS FUN 56 (2008).

19

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”).
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who will check legislative as well as executive conduct and who will do so long after the
president departs the scene. Moreover, a president does not anticipate working with, or
generally even having anything more than casual future contact with, a justice. The president
will no doubt prefer a justice likely to interpret law in a manner consistent with administration
objectives but the president is less likely to value personal compatibility given the infrequency of
contact and his lack of responsibility for the justice’s performance. Whereas cabinet members
must be loyal, constitutional norms dictate that a judge purge any feelings of gratitude in
discharging his duties. Finally, the president makes numerous cabinet choices but few to the
Court.
Supreme Court nominations most resemble vice-presidential selections. Like the choice
of a running mate, they are unique, significant, and highly visible. Since vice presidents, like
justices, have tenure of sorts, albeit for only four years, neither is constitutionally accountable to
the president, although political considerations give vice presidents incentive to support the chief
executive. Yet again, the differences exceed the similarities. Unlike vice-presidential selections,
the choice of a Supreme Court nominee is not generally made in immediate anticipation of a
presidential campaign. Court vacancies occur unpredictably within the four year presidential
term. Unlike a vice-presidential candidate, the Supreme Court nominee is not on the ticket and is
not presented to the electorate as the presidential successor, thereby reducing, but not
eliminating, the personal consequences of the choice to the President.20 Unlike justices, vice
presidents have regular access to the president and help him discharge his duties.

20

See generally JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF A
POLITICAL INSTITUTION 46–89 (1982).
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Presidential nominations to the Supreme Court are, accordingly, peculiar presidential
acts. A president’s performance elsewhere may give some hints regarding how he will handle
nominations to the highest Court but the distinctive elements may produce unpredictable
presidential behavior. Accordingly, the topic merits separate study.
C. The Gaps in the Existing Literature
That has rarely occurred. Neither the importance nor the uniqueness of presidential
selection of justices has produced an account which furnishes a convincing framework to
understand how presidents make those calls. Space does not allow discussion of all of the major
works on the subject but a few major accounts are mentioned below to illustrate prior treatments.
Some admirable works on the subject treat the subject historically, by providing case
studies or presenting the chronology of presidential nominations. In his classic work, Henry J.
Abraham traces the history of presidential nominations to the Court. Abraham identified a
“quartet of steadily occurring criteria” as motivating nominations, namely objective merit,
friendship, representation of particular areas, groups or interests, and “political and ideological
compatibility”21 with the latter as the “controlling factor.” These factors are important but this
formulation fails to account adequately for the complex and dynamic nature of the enterprise.
Although it disclosed some patterns it failed to explain a good deal of presidential behavior.
How does a president decide between prospective nominees when he is politically and
ideologically compatible with each? Why do different presidents seek to favor different areas,
groups or interests? Nor does it explain why the same President appoints people who are quite
21

ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 2; see also RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION PROCESS 41–51 (2005) (following Abraham’s criteria); MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL PROCESS 129 (stating that different presidents
consider merit, friendship, diversity and philosophy).
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different from one another. Why did Woodrow Wilson nominate James McReynolds and Louis
D. Brandeis, why did Reagan nominate O’Connor and Antonin Scalia, why did George H.W.
Bush nominate David Souter and Clarence Thomas? Or for that matter why did George W. Bush
choose Roberts, Harriet Miers and Sam Alito for the same seat in that order?
Christine Nemacheck adopted a quite different approach. Based on archival research, she
developed short lists from which recent presidents have worked and argued that presidents
choose strategically “to limit their uncertainty about two major factors in the appointment
process: the future behavior of their nominees once confirmed and sworn in … and the
likelihood of Senate confirmation.”22 Nemacheck suggested that presidents “pursue an
information strategy” regarding their selections23 to “select the most ideologically compatible
candidates when they perceive confirmation constraints to be less restrictive on their choice.”24
Presidents must, however, accommodate their strategies to the imperative that their nominee win
support of a senate majority. Thus, presidents facing a cross-party senate “follow a political
strategy” to select a confirmable candidate.25
Nemacheck’s account convincingly argues that presidents act strategically in choosing
justices as they do in other decision-making.26 Yet it is unconvincing in its suggestion that
presidents choose the most ideologically compatible candidate absent confirmation constraints
22

NEMACHECK, supra note 5, at 29.

23

Id. at 111.

24

Id. at 127.

25

Id. at 131.

26

See generally GEORGE C. EDWARDS, III, THE STRATEGIC PRESIDENT: PERSUASION AND OPPORTUNITY IN
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP (2009); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWEL AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS
(1990).
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and alternatively seek one who is confirmable. Surely presidents have weighed those factors
heavily but an account which focuses on ideology and confirmation oversimplifies a multifaceted
process. Often considerations other than choosing the most ideologically compatible candidate
influence presidents even when they do not face serious Senate constraints.
Finally, through a series of fascinating case studies, David Yalof shows that the ultimate
selection is often the product of a battle between factions within an administration which the
president must arbitrate.27 A president often depends on advisers whose interests may not
coincide with his own. Yalof identifies an aspect of the process but does not provide a full
account of how the selection occurs or how presidents decide.
Although these presidential decisions can be examined “systematically,”28 the number of
factors involved and their varying weight in different administrations, and at different times
within each administration, necessarily means that the “system” must have a good deal of play in
the springs. Continuities exist yet each choice is unique.
Ultimately, a president’s Supreme Court choice turns upon three variables—the pool of
available candidates, the context in which the choice is made, and the idiosyncrasies of the
president. Any effort to predict, assess or understand a particular Court nomination or the way in
which justices are nominated must consider those three components and their interaction. The
next three sections discuss them in turn drawing from nominations since 1900.

27

DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT
NOMINEES 3 (1999).
28

See, e.g., NEMACHECK, supra note 5, at 7.
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Data from that period illustrates the role and importance of these three variables in
shaping choice. One caveat must be kept in mind. Presidential selection today has changed from
1900 or from 1950 or even 1980. Although the three variables of pool, context and presidential
idiosyncrasy remain helpful organizing factors, some of the particular considerations within each
category are less relevant today than they once were. Sections VI and VII adjust for those
changes.
II.

Forming the Pool

In one sense, presidents choose Supreme Court nominees from a large pool of potential
candidates. The Constitution prescribes no qualification for appointment to the Court except to
prohibit a religious test,29 a requirement sometimes honored in the breach. Although the pool of
eligible nominees technically is unbounded, in practice several characteristics define and limit it.
In fact, the various factors often work together to provide a president with a relatively small pool
of viable candidates.
First, every Supreme Court justice has been a lawyer. Occasionally presidents consider,
but never nominate, non-lawyers.30
Second, Supreme Court nominees generally are drawn from those between ages 47 and
62. Although the youngest nominee since 1900, William O. Douglas, was 40 when nominated,

29

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several
State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”).
30
See CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF GOVERNMENT 66–68, 208–09 (2001) (discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of the lawyers’ monopoly); Philip B. Kurland, The Appointment and Disappointment
of Supreme Court Justices, 1972 LAW & SOC. ORD. 183, 189 (1972) (arguing for need for justices to be lawyers); see
also EDWIN M. YODER, JR., VACANCY: A JUDICIAL MISADVENTURE (2010) (a novel regarding appointment of nonlawyer to Court).
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and the oldest, Stone, was 68, when named chief justice, most – 40 of the 68 - were in their
fifties.

Only six were younger than 47 when nominated31 and six were 63 or over;32

accordingly 56 of the 68 nominees (82%) were within the 47 to 62 range. Those nominated to be
chief justice have tended to be older; only three (Roberts, 50; Fortas, 58; and Vinson, 56) of the
ten were under 60 and four of the six who were 63 or over when appointed were chief justices.33
Third, the available pool differs depending on the president’s party identification. Not
surprisingly, presidents generally consider and choose justices who share their party affiliation.
Presidents nominated someone from the opposing party on only ten of the 68 instances or 14% of
the time (Table B).34 Two of the cross-party nominees were associate justices elevated to be
chief justices, nominations which did not alter the Court‘s party composition.35 Four presidents
seemed to want to make a cross-party selection. Harding chose Pierce Butler, a Minnesota
Democrat, in part because the Court then included only two Democrats.36 Franklin Roosevelt
thought it prudent to elevate a Republican, Stone, to chief justice to foster national unity on the
eve of war. When Owen Roberts retired early in the presidency of Harry S. Truman, the
president concluded he should appoint a Republican to demonstrate bipartisanship and since only

31

John Parker, William Douglas, Potter Stewart, Byron “Whizzer” White, Douglas Ginsburg, and Clarence Thomas.
Horace Lurton, Edward White, William Howard Taft, Charles Hughes, Harlan Fiske Stone and Lewis Powell.
Senator Borah opposed Taft’s nomination in part based on his age, arguing that Taft was within seven years of the
age of incompetence. Ex-President Taft Succeeds White as Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1921, at 1.
33
White, Taft, Hughes, and Stone. The average age at appointment as chief justice since 1900 was 61.
32

34

I have not included Wilson’s nomination of Louis Brandeis and Roosevelt’s of Felix Frankfurter as cross-party
nominees since in each case the judicial nominee had been a strong supporter of the President when he ran for
office.

35

Those two instances were President Taft’s elevation of Justice Edward White in 1910 and President Franklin
Roosevelt’s elevation of Stone in 1941.
36

DAVID J. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS APPOINTED 84, 86–87 (1980).
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one Republican remained on the Court.37 Eisenhower chose Brennan, a New Jersey Democrat.
But generally, presidents have considered and selected nominees from their party.
Cross-party nominees are becoming rarer. The last such nomination, Powell in 1971,
occurred 40 years ago. Particularly in modern times, Democratic and Republican Presidents
consider distinctive pools with no overlap.38 For instance, a Democratic president would not
have appointed Powell to the Court in 1971 or considered Senator Robert Byrd as did Nixon.39
Table B Cross-party Nominees Since 1900
Year

President

Nominee

1909
1910
1910
1922
1932
1941
1945
1956
1969
1971

Taft
Taft
Taft
Harding
Hoover
F. Roosevelt
Truman
Eisenhower
Nixon
Nixon

Horace Lurton
Edward White
Joseph Lamar
Pierce Butler
Benjamin Cardozo
Harlan Fiske Stone
Harold Burton
William Brennan, Jr.
Clement E. Haynsworth, Jr.
Lewis Powell, Jr.

37

YALOF, supra note 27, at 21–26.

38

NEMACHECK, supra note 5, at 152 55 (listing those of shortlists of Presidents Ford to Bush (43)). Only Judge
Amalya Kearse, a Carter appointee to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, appears on cross‐
party lists of Reagan and Clinton yet it seems inconceivable that Reagan would have selected her and her inclusion
on his lists probably reflects a desire to cover demographic bases.
39

DEAN, supra note 17, at 126, 133–36.
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Fourth, candidate availability, as well as presidential preference, shapes the pool from
which a president chooses. Some attractive candidates find other career options more appealing
than serving on the Court.40 Presidents can’t always get who they want.
Conversely, other names land in pools repeatedly, sometimes lending a short list a “round
up the usual suspects” quality. Some eventual nominees were passed over before being chosen;41
other prospective candidates were frequently listed but never selected.42

40

Taft declined spots on the Court in 1902-1903, to complete his work in the Philippines and, in 1906, to seek the
presidency. Moreover, Taft wanted to be chief justice, a position not then open. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON,
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 17-33 (1964); A.L TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS 23-29 (1964). Senator and former Attorney General Philander Knox declined Roosevelt’s offer in 1906
as did Secretary of State Elihu H. Root. ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 129. Attorney General Francis Biddle
reportedly declined when Byrnes’ resignation created Roosevelt’s final vacancy. Id. at 186. And John Foster Dulles
and Tom Dewey removed themselves from consideration in 1953 when Chief Justice Fred Vinson died. Id. at 199;
DEAN, supra note 17, at 12; RICHARD M. NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON, 419 (1978). Herbert
Brownell, Dewey, Justice Potter Stewart and John Mitchell were among those who reportedly declined to be
considered for chief justice in 1969. Conversation with Newsmen on the Nomination of the Chief Justice of the
United States, PUB. PAPERS 393-394 (May 22, 1969); STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE TRIUMPH OF A
POLITICIAN, 1962-1972, 274 (1989); NIXON, supra note 40, at 418–420. Powell removed himself for consideration
for the nomination which went to Judge Clement Haynsworth. DEAN, supra note 17, at 16. Representative Richard
Poff was Nixon’s first choice for the appointments which ultimately went to Powell and Rehnquist; he withdrew for
family reasons. Id. at 117–121 (explaining Poff’s withdrawal to protect his son from learning he had been adopted).
Clinton apparently would have appointed New York Governor Mario Cuomo to the vacancy created by the
retirement of Justice Byron White in 1993. Cuomo, after avoiding Clinton’s calls and then considering, and
reconsidering, sent word that he was unavailable moments before Clinton was going to offer him the nomination.
TAYLOR BRANCH, THE CLINTON TAPES: WRESTLING HISTORY WITH THE PRESIDENT 42–43 (2009); BILL CLINTON,
MY LIFE 524 (2004); GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS, ALL TOO HUMAN: A POLITICAL EDUCATION 166–68, 170–74
(1999). Clinton also offered the nomination to Secretary of Education and former Governor Richard Riley. JEFFREY
TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF tHE SUPREME COURT 76–77 (2008). A year later, Clinton’s first
choice was Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell but Mitchell declined Clinton’s offer so as not to hurt the
chances of passing health care legislation, CLINTON, at 592, and Clinton’s chances for re-election. BRANCH, at 129.
Miguel Estrada refused to be considered for the O’Connor and Rehnquist seats. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG,
SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDER STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE SUPREME COURT 198, 248
(2007). Judge Maura Corrigan of the Michigan Supreme Court also reportedly refused to be considered for the
O’Connor vacancy. Id. at 198.
41

Justices Horace Lurton, Stanley Reed, Sherman Minton, Wiley Rutledge, Robert Jackson, Warren E. Burger,
Robert Bork, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Stephen Breyer, Samuel J. Alito, and Elena Kagan were among the
nominees who were passed over at least once. See NEMACHECK, supra note 5, at 147–55 (providing generally
reliable short lists).
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Sixth, the pool of potential nominees has come from six occupational categories. Those
considered and appointed are federal judges, state judges, federal appointed officers, high
ranking elected officials, prominent lawyers or academics. These professional groups are by no
means equal sources of Supreme Court prospects as Table C suggests.
Table C Professions of Supreme Court Nominees When Selected
1900-2011

1900-1955

1956-2011

33

11

22

State Judges

5

3

2

Private Attorneys

8

6

2

Academics

2

2

0

Elected Office

5

5

0

Appointed Office

15

9

6

Federal Judges

Federal judges are the most prolific source of Supreme Court nominees, especially
recently. They provided 30% of the nominees during the first half of the period in question but
69% during the latter half and 80% of the nominees since 1968.43 Although the data for those
considered is more obscure and less reliable, especially for the earlier periods, in this respect

42

Lewis Schwellenbach, Elbert Tuttle, Edith Jones, Emilio Garza, and Diane Wood are among those considered, but
passed over, on multiple occasions. See NEMACHECK, supra note 5, at 147–55 (providing generally reliable short
lists).
43
The exceptions since 1968 were Powell, Rehnquist (1971), O’Connor, Miers and Kagan. See Felix Frankfurter,
The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781 (1957) (arguing against prior judicial
experience as necessary qualification).
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those selected seem to reflect the short lists, too.44 Appointed federal officials have provided the
second most frequent source of Court nominees, accounting for 22% of the total, although the
figures differ during the two periods. During the first period, 25% of nominees were appointed
officials, a category which provided almost as many nominees (9) as the federal bench (11).
During the second half, 18% have been appointed officials. Harriet Miers and Elena Kagan were
the only executive branch officials nominated to the Court in almost 40 years.45 State judges
have provided 6%-8% of the nominees throughout the period although the most recent such
appointee was O’Connor 30 years ago.46 Elected officials, a category which provided 14% of
nominees during the first part of the period, have not provided a nominee since Governor Earl
Warren in 1953 although Clinton offered nominations to Governor Mario Cuomo, former
Governor (and Secretary of Education) Richard Riley and Senator George Mitchell47 and Nixon

44

See generally NEMACHECK, supra note 5, at 147–55. Except for two close associates, Miers and Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales, all of those George W. Bush seriously considered were federal judges. See id. at 154–55.
President Obama’s first shortlist of four reportedly included two federal judges; he chose Kagan from a short list
which included at least three federal judges. President Clinton considered primarily federal judges although he also
considered various elected politicians. See BRANCH, supra note 40, at 131; NEMACHECK, supra note 5, at 154;
TOOBIN, supra note 40, at 75–82. Presidents Ford, Reagan and George H.W. Bush considered primarily federal
judges although President Reagan expanded the pool for the O’Connor appointment and reportedly considered
Senators Orrin Hatch and Howell Heflin when he nominated Robert Bork. NEMACHECK, supra note 5, at 152–54;
YALOF, supra note 27, at 156–57; Gerald Boyd, Move to Right Seen, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1987, at A1.
45

Prior to Miers, President Nixon nominated Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist in 1971, President
Johnson nominated Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall in 1967, President Kennedy nominated Deputy Attorney
General Byron “Whizzer” White and Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg in 1962. President Truman nominated
two members of his Cabinet—Secretary of Treasury Fred Vinson and Attorney General Tom Clark. Four of those
Franklin Roosevelt nominated—Stanley Reed, William O. Douglas, Frank Murphy, and Robert Jackson-- served in
the executive branch or, in one case, at an independent administrative agency.

46

During the last 80 years, Presidents have nominated three state judges: Judge Benjamin Cardozo (1930), Judge
William Brennan, Jr. (1956) and Judge Sandra Day O’Connor (1981). Most of Judge David Souter’s judicial
experience had been on New Hampshire state courts when President George H.W. Bush nominated him to the Court
in 1990. Relatively few state judges have received serious consideration.

47

CLINTON, supra note 40, at 534, 592; JOHN MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 151–53
(1995); YALOF, supra note 27, at 197–205.
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offered a nomination to Senator Howard Baker in 1971.48 Similarly, practicing lawyers have
declined as a source of nominees. Eight of those chosen since 1900 were private attorneys
when nominated49 but Powell in 1971 was the last chosen and there is little evidence that many
have recently received serious consideration.50 And academics comprise a tiny portion of the
pool, with no sitting academic having been appointed since Franklin Roosevelt chose Frankfurter
more than 70 years ago.51
These factors limit the period during which any individual is a viable candidate and
introduce a large element of fortuity into the process. If being a federal judge is deemed an
important credential, an otherwise distinguished lawyer may be passed over until confirmed for a
lower court. The case of John Roberts is illustrative. Born in 1955, his years within the target
age range of 47-62 are 2002 to 2017. The senate did not act on the first President Bush’s
nomination of Roberts to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1992
and Roberts did not join that court until 2003 when nominated by the second Bush. Roberts’s
lack of a judicial credential would have substantially reduced his chances of selection had
Supreme Court vacancies occurred early in Bush’s first, rather than second, term.52 Roberts’s

48

DEAN, supra note 17, 203 24.

49

Joseph Rucker Lamar, Brandeis, George Sutherland, Pierce Butler, Owen Roberts, Charles Evans Hughes (1930),
Abe Fortas and Powell. Hughes and Sutherland, of course, had distinguished themselves through their public
service and more properly belong in other categories.

50

NEMACHECK, supra note 5, at 151 52 (listing Albert Jenner as considered by Johnson and Herschel Friday and
William French Smith by Nixon).
51

Kennedy seriously considered Harvard Professor Paul A. Freund in 1962 but no other law professors seem to
have been serious candidates in recent decades. A number of former academics have been selected including
Lurton, Harlan Fisk Stone, Douglas, Rutledge, Scalia, Bork, Douglas Ginsburg, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan.

52

GREENBURG, supra note 40, at 242.
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nomination was contingent on factors such as Bush’s contested election in 2000 and narrow reelection in 2004, Roberts’s lower court confirmation in 2003, and the timing of the vacancies.
The pool from which a particular president selects is thus limited by a standard range of
factors including party identification, age, and occupation. As suggested below, ideological and
demographic factors may impose other filters which further narrow the pool of viable candidates.
A president who assumes office after the other party has held the White House for eight years
may find few federal judges in place who he regards as plausible nominees especially if a
vacancy arises early in the term.
III.

The Context in Which the Choice is Made

Presidential decision-making regarding Supreme Court vacancies does not occur in a
vacuum. Presidents operate in a political context. A range of factors which are largely beyond
their control present a web of opportunities and constraints. The context always is
multidimensional and requires presidents to navigate a political terrain with markers which
generally point in different directions. Presidents consider whether a nominee can be confirmed
but they also respond to other concerns. Although the variables always differ, recurring factors
include the following.53
A) The Senate

53

See, e.g., EISGRUBER, NEXT JUSTICE supra note 3, at 125 29; LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND
CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 66, 70 71, 77 78 (2005) (mentioning qualifications, Senate
composition, ABA recommendations); NEMACHECK, supra note 5, at 114 19, 130 32 (emphasizing Senate
composition as check); YALOF, supra note 27, at 4 6 (mentioning timing of vacancy, Senate composition, public
approval of president, attributes of outgoing justice, pool of candidates as constraints).
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Since the senate must advise and consent to any nomination as a prerequisite to
appointment, its composition will constrain presidential nominations. Presidents must consider
the senate’s likely disposition to potential nominees or proceed at their peril.
The senate’s party makeup is the most obvious variable. A president who faces a senate
the opposing party controls (cross-party control) has less latitude than one who submits a
nominee to a senate where his party holds a majority (unified government). Since 1900, several
defeated nominations involved cross-party control. A Democratic senate (57 Democratic, 43
Republican) defeated Nixon’s nominations of Haynsworth (45-55) and Carswell (45-51) and a
Democratic senate (55 Democratic, 45 Republican) defeated Reagan’s nomination of Bork (4258).
Notwithstanding those episodes, since 1900 most nominations have succeeded in
situations of cross-party senate control. Senates with Democratic majorities confirmed 12
nominations by Republican Presidents Eisenhower (Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker, and Stewart),
Nixon (Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist), Ford (Stevens), Reagan (Kennedy), and Bush
(Souter, Thomas). Thus, 80% of the nominations involving cross-party control have been
confirmed.54 Relatively few negative votes were cast against those successful cross-party
nominees.55 Although presidents benefited from some degree of deference, that track record also
traced to the president’s willingness to offer nominees acceptable to a majority of senators.

54

I have not included the withdrawal of the Douglas Ginsberg selection in this calculation. If it is included, it
reduces the success rate to 12 of 16 or 75%.
55

Brennan, Whittaker, Blackmun, Stevens, and, Kennedy were confirmed unanimously, Powell with one adverse
vote and Burger with three. The votes on the other nominations were: Harlan, 71-11; Stewart, 70-17; Rehnquist, 6826 and 65-33; Thomas, 52-48. LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFERY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATE, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 357–58 (3d ed. 2003).

24

Unified government may simplify the president’s challenge but it does not guarantee a
perfunctory, or even favorable, advice and consent process. A Republican senate rejected Judge
John Parker in 1930.56 Johnson withdrew the Fortas-Thornberry nominations in 1968 after a
majority Democratic senate failed to act when Republicans filibustered with support from
southern Democrats.57 Bush had to withdraw the Miers nomination in 2005 even though his
party controlled the senate. 58
To be sure, the nominations which failed in unified government conditions involved
somewhat different circumstances. Whereas the opposition party primarily prevented the FortasThornberry nominations (with help from southern Democrats), the president’s own party forced
Miers to withdraw. Yet the Parker, Fortas-Thornberry and Miers experiences suggest that a
cooperative advice and consent process does not turn simply on which party controls the
senate.59
Nonetheless, the senate’s party composition surely impacts presidential decision-making.
A president with a cooperative senate may choose differently than one facing a less compliant
body. Franklin Roosevelt was in a much stronger position in submitting Black and Reed to a
56

ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 32–33, 158.

57

See, e.g., KALMAN, supra note 16, at 327–33 (1990); MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES 28–32 (1994).
Fortas’s situation was made more precarious by Johnson’s status as a lame duck president. See Keith E.
Whittington, Presidents, Senates, and Failed Supreme Court Nominations 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 401, 418 (2006).

58

GREENBURG, supra note 40, at 269–84; Stras & Scott, supra note 1, at 1894.

59

Cf. Whittington, supra note 57, at 436 (“Supreme Court appointments within unified government have become a
presidential prerogative, requiring little consultation or consideration of senatorial interests. It requires a dramatic
misstep (Miers) or a faltering party (Parker and Fortas) to lose a nominee to a same-party Senate.”). Some other
nominations under unified government conditions also received sizeable (i.e. more than ten) negative votes
including Pitney (50-26), Brandeis (47-22), Hughes (52-26), Black (63-16), Minton (48-16), Marshall (69-11),
Roberts (78-22), Alito (58-42), Sotomayor (68-31) and Kagan (63-37). Supreme Court Nominations, present-1789,
UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm.
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Senate with 76 Democrats and Frankfurter, Douglas and Murphy to one with 69 Democrats than
was Ford, whose nominee had to win approval from a senate with 60 Democrats or George H.W.
Bush, who faced a Senate with 55 Democrats.60 Those adverse numbers may have influenced
Ford to favor Stevens in 1975 over more conservative options. Similarly, President George
H.W. Bush may have seen Souter as more acceptable for the senate than alternatives who were
more closely identified with the Reagan wing of the party.61
Of course, the president cannot assess the senate as a constraint by simply counting copartisans and cross-partisans. Even in a unified government context, the president must consider
the loyalty of co-partisans, whether the other party is united and the intensity and size of possible
opposition. A senate with 64 Democrats was insufficient to confirm Fortas and Thornberry
because southern Democrats were not loyal and Republicans were united and willing to
filibuster.
Sometimes simply winning confirmation is not sufficient for a president. One who seeks
to unify the country or reflect strength or competence may seek a nominee likely to be confirmed
with limited or no opposition.62 Alternatively, presidents may avoid a controversial, but

60

See Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, UNITED STATES SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm; see also Whittington, supra note 57,
at 403 (arguing that scandal free, well-credentialed nominees generally are confirmed in unified government
situations if their philosophies are in the mainstream of their party).
61

GREENBURG, supra note 40, at 97; TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH & DAVID HACKETT SOUTER: TRADITIONAL
REPUBLICAN ON THE REHNQUIST COURT 104 (2005). The backing of influential Senator Warren Rudman also
helped influence Bush. Rudman’s lobbying had helped put Souter’s name in play for the earlier seat which went to
Anthony Kennedy. See Linda Greenhouse, A New Contender is Seen for Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1987, at A22.
62

Conversation with Newsmen on the Nomination of the Chief Justice of the United States, PUB. PAPERS 391-392
(May 22, 1969) (explaining Nixon’s nomination of Burger); YALOF, supra note 27, at 198 (explaining Clinton’s
nomination of Ginsburg); Gwen Ifill, Pragmatic Jurist, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1994, at 1, 10 (explaining Clinton’s
nomination of Breyer).
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confirmable, choice to avoid antagonizing senators whose support is needed elsewhere. Any
prospect Kennedy would nominate Judge William Hastie was hurt by the likelihood that the
nomination of an African-American jurist would upset southerners whose cooperation Kennedy
needed.63 President George H. W. Bush was anxious to avoid a divisive battle over a nominee to
succeed Brennan to preserve capital for other pending challenges.64 Faced with an economic
crisis and ambitious domestic agenda, Obama sought to avoid controversial candidates whose
nominations would complicate achieving other goals.
The president may feel compelled to accommodate senate reactions to prior nominees.
After Carswell’s defeat, Nixon announced that he had concluded the senate would not confirm a
southern strict constructionist so he would seek one from a different part of the country.65
Constrained by his need for a political victory, Nixon nominated Blackmun who satisfied his
criteria and presumably would follow the lead of his close friend, Burger.66
Nearly two decades later, history repeated itself. After the senate defeated Reagan’s
nomination of Bork, 58-42, Reagan had to withdraw his choice of Judge Douglas Ginsburg

63
64

YALOF, supra note 27, at 78.
GREENBURG, supra note 40, at 88; YALOF, supra note 27, at 191–192.

65

Remarks to Reporters About Nominations to the Supreme Court, PUB. PAPERS 345 (April 9, 1970); see also
Statement About Nominations to the Supreme Court, PUB. PAPERS 345–46 (April 9, 1970). Of course, Carswell’s
mediocrity and racist comments, not his origins, caused his defeat. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 11–13; DEAN,
supra note 17, at 18-23. Nixon’s Chief of Staff, H.R. Bob Haldeman, wrote that Nixon was initially disposed to
nominate Senator Robert Byrd (D.W.Va) following Carswell’s defeat but that Haldeman suggested “that if it was
obvious this Senate would not approve a Southerner, then put in a good Northern constructionist.” H.R.
HALDEMAN, THE HALDEMAN DIARIES: INSIDE THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE 147 (1994).
66

JOHN EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER: THE NIXON YEARS, 129 (1982); see also Robert B. Semple, Jr., Judge
Blackmun of Minnesota is Named to Supreme Court Seat by the President, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1970, at 1, 34
(noting Blackmun’s support by Mondale and Humphrey).
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following revelations of past drug use.67 More moderate officials, like chief of staff Howard
Baker, persuaded Reagan to nominate Judge Anthony Kennedy.68 “The experience of the last
several months has made all of us a bit wiser,” conceded Reagan in announcing Kennedy’s
nomination. Whereas Bork and Ginsburg had been depicted as strict constructionists, Reagan
now suggested that “the mood and the time is now right for all Americans in this bicentennial
year of the Constitution to join together in a bipartisan effort to fulfill our constitutional
obligation of restoring the United States Supreme Court to full strength.”69 Senate conservatives
were upset but Reagan accepted “political reality” which included Democratic control of the
senate and his weakened position.70
B) Presidential Strength
As suggested above, senate composition is not the only determinant of confirmability
and confirmability is not the only political factor which influences presidential choice. A
president’s political strength or weakness may affect selection. Public opinion polls provide one
measure. A president with high approval ratings is likely to be in a stronger position than one
whose standing is precarious. Surely, Johnson was weakened in 1968 (his public approval rating
67

Statement on the Withdrawal of the Supreme Court Nomination of Douglas H. Ginsburg, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1300
(November 7, 1987). Reagan first had to undergo an awkward media exchange in which the law and order President
explained why he excused past drug use by his Supreme Court nominee. See Informal Exchange With Reporters on
the Supreme Court Nomination of Douglas H. Ginsburg, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1292 (November 6, 1987); see also
Remarks to Ethnic and Minority Administration Supporters on the Supreme Court Nomination of Douglas H.
Ginsburg, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1294 (November 6, 1987).
68

YALOF, supra note 27, at 2; see also Joel Brinkley, May Face a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1987, at A1; Steven
V. Roberts, Baker Seems to Be Vindicated, But the Cost is Proving High, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1987, at A1.
69

Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1322 (November 11, 1987).

70

Linda Greenhouse, Reagan Nominates Anthony Kennedy to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1987, at A1,
B10.
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had fallen to around 40%) when he nominated Fortas and Thornberry71 as was Reagan in 1987
when he named Bork.72 Yet robust ratings do not assure success and modest ones are not
necessarily fatal. Nixon’s approval ratings were around or above 60% when his nominations of
Haynsworth and Carswell were defeated and about 50% when Powell and Rehnquist were
overwhelmingly approved.73
In addition to the public opinion scores, the trajectory of events and the way politicians
perceive a president may affect selection. Reagan was much weakened in 1987 after the
Democrats won control of the senate, his approval numbers declined, and the Iran-Contra
debacle had tarnished his professional reputation.74 After Bork’s nomination was rejected and
that of Ginsburg withdrawn, Reagan recognized that his ability to win senate approval was
significantly compromised.
Clinton’s political vulnerability affected his choice of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
1993. Clinton could not afford another embarrassing defeat after the failed efforts to appoint Zoe
Baird and Judge Kimba Wood as attorney general and Lani Guinier as assistant attorney general
raised questions regarding his competence. “Sexy was good, but safe was better. We simply

71

See Presidential Job Approval Center, GALLUP, June 26-July 1, 1968,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/124922/Presidential-Job-Approval-Center.aspx.
72

Interview with A.C. Culvahouse 51–52 (April 1, 2004) (transcript available at the Ronald Reagan Oral History
Project). Reagan’s approval ratings were in the high 40s but well below their measure before the Iran-Contra story
became public the prior autumn. See Presidential Job Approval Center, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/124922/Presidential‐Job‐Approval‐Center.aspx.
73

See Presidential Job Approval Center, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/124922/Presidential-Job-ApprovalCenter.aspx.
74

ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 281–83; GREENBURG, supra note 40, at 47.

29

couldn’t afford another failed nomination,”75 presidential adviser George Stephanopoulos later
wrote. Clinton needed a smooth senate confirmation process to help establish presidential
credentials. Clinton wanted to appoint Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt but feared
opposition from westerners upset over Babbitt’s policies regarding grazing fees and mineral
rights. Babbitt was deemed confirmable but the process would be costly. Babbitt’s nomination
would have added another vacancy to “an overloaded appointment process.” Breyer, initially a
leading candidate, had first paid social security taxes for a nanny belatedly after Justice White’s
retirement was announced. Clinton was not anxious to revisit a path which had cost him two
nominees for attorney general. Ginsburg minimized the risk that the Clinton White House would
be perceived as inept.76
The Miers nomination may have reflected Bush’s feeling of political weakness. His poll
ratings had declined and his administration was being criticized for mishandling the response to
Hurricane Katrina. Some Democrats, including senate minority leader Harry Reid, had
suggested Miers.77 Bush may have thought his weakened status counseled against choosing a
movement conservative who would antagonize Democratic senators and interest groups. He
misread the political context. Widespread conservative opposition to Miers made clear that the
biggest threat came from alienating his base, not the Democratic minority.78
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STEPHANOPOULOS, supra note 40, at 168.
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Id. at 168–70; GREENBURG, supra note 40, at 167–70.

77
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The political calendar may also impose weakness. A president near the end of his service
may find his powers diminished,79 particularly if party control of the White House seems
precarious. Johnson experienced the classic perils of a lame duck nominator. Johnson had
withdrawn from the presidential race and was unpopular when he nominated Fortas and
Thornberry in June, 1968. Republicans sensed Nixon would be elected and southern Democrats
saw Fortas as a symbol of their grievances against the Warren Court. Although senate minority
leader Everett Dirksen had publicly praised the nominees, by nightfall on announcement day
more than 50% of the 36 Republicans had publicly opposed Johnson appointing Warren’s
successor and others seemed likely to follow suit. 80
C) Political Commitments
Campaign commitments sometimes limit presidential choice. Many presidential
candidates make campaign promises regarding Court nominations.81 A president’s past political
statements create expectations which constrain behavior. A president ignores public
commitments at his peril. Such behavior disappoints supporters and subjects the president’s
credibility to question.
Nixon pledged to appoint strict constructionists and law and order justices during his
1968 presidential campaign.82 He felt indebted to southern and border states for the nomination
and the necessary electoral votes. Moreover, “the South had become an essential political base
79
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to his reelection in 1972.”83 This political context worked against appointing Herbert Brownell
as chief justice since he was unacceptable to the south84 due to his advocacy of the Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.85 Ultimately, four of Nixon’s six nominees came from
the south or southwest. Nixon’s second choice, Haynsworth, was calculated to please the south.
86

After Haynsworth’s defeat, Nixon nominated Carswell, another southerner who had been a

blatant segregationist.87 Nixon used Carswell’s defeat to pander to the south.88 When two other
vacancies presented themselves, Nixon nominated Powell of Virginia and Rehnquist of Arizona
after considering other southerners.89
Reagan promised to appoint a woman to the Court during the 1980 campaign. In
announcing O’Connor’s selection, he acknowledged that commitment.90 In redeeming this
pledge, Reagan angered some supporters who characterized O’Connor as pro-abortion.91
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Similarly, George W. Bush had repeatedly promised to name strict constructionists. The
Republican conservative base sought to hold him to that commitment when Bush first considered
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, and then nominated Miers, to replace O’Connor.
Republican conservatives suspected either would stray from their principles and accordingly
opposed their nominations.92
D) Presidential Promises
Presidential commitments may be personal as well as public. Presidents sometimes
promise a Supreme Court seat. Whether they fulfill the pledge ultimately depends on a mix of
factors including the force of competing considerations.
Harding joined the line of Republican presidents who promised Taft appointment as chief
justice. 93 He had also promised his friend, former Senator George Sutherland, the first open
seat. When the first vacancy occurred upon the death of Chief Justice White, Harding resolved
the dilemma by appointing Taft chief justice and naming Sutherland to the next vacancy.94
Eisenhower had promised to appoint Warren to the first Court vacancy when he was not
able to place him in his cabinet. When Chief Justice Vinson’s unexpected death made the center
seat that opening, Eisenhower sought to redefine his promise as the first associate justiceship,
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considered some other candidates for chief justice, and instructed Attorney General Brownell to
seek Warren’s assent to that interpretation. Warren, insisted that the “first vacancy … means the
first vacancy”95 and Eisenhower nominated Warren rather than be seen as reneging on his
commitment.96
Some Presidents allow other considerations to override, or defer, fulfillment of their
promises. Harding postponed his pledge to Sutherland and Eisenhower sought to narrow his to
Warren. Truman had promised Secretary of Labor Lewis B. Schwellenbach that he would
appoint him to the first Court vacancy97 but decided that he needed to appoint a Republican,
thereby disqualifying Schwellenbach. John Kennedy had promised Arthur Goldberg strong
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consideration for a judicial vacancy.98

Kennedy did not wish to spare Goldberg’s services as

Secretary of Labor when Justice Charles Whittaker resigned in March, 1962 when a possible
steel strike loomed but was willing to do so when Justice Frankfurter’s retirement that summer
created another vacancy after the strike threat had passed.99
E). Qualifications
Presidents have multiple incentives to choose well-qualified nominees. Able people are
likely to serve well and accordingly reflect well on the appointing president. Merit, of course, is
often in the eye of the beholder and accordingly assessments regarding the qualifications of
potential candidates are likely to be controversial. Yet presidential choice is constrained by the
credentials of potential choices. Some literature confirms the common sense conclusion that the
senate is less likely to reject candidates with gaudy resumes.100 An impressive nominee
eliminates one argument against confirmation which might otherwise influence some and
provide cover for others. Moreover, a president may enhance his image by a meritorious choice
and hurt it if he chooses someone whose claim seems marginal. Accordingly, the qualifications,
or lack thereof, of potential nominees may affect presidential decision.101
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Some anecdotal evidence supports this intuitive judgment. Carswell’s mediocrity was
conceded even by his supporters102 and Miers clearly brought relatively modest credentials as
even her handlers came to appreciate.103 Neither nomination succeeded and both reflected
poorly on the presidents who made the selections. Similarly, Nixon determined he could not go
forward with the nominations of Herschel Friday and Judge Mildred Lillie after the ABA judged
them to be unimpressive candidates.104 Yet clearly merit is not the only relevant variable. Bork,
Parker, Haynsworth, and Fortas were all able jurists yet were not confirmed. Brandeis was
enormously qualified yet almost failed to receive committee approval.
Perceived merit may not guarantee confirmation yet it surely helps clear the way. The
relationship of merit to confirmation and to presidential image makes it a contextual constraint
which presidents ignore at their peril.
F). Timing; The Rest of the Agenda
The timing of a vacancy may affect a president’s choice. The opportunity to make a
Supreme Court nomination, though significant, never appears alone on the president’s radar
screen. Presidents often must consider the impact of a potential nominee on other priorities.
Truman’s first vacancy occurred when Owen Roberts retired less than three months after
Truman became president. Roberts’s departure left the court with only one Republican at a time
the new president faced major preoccupations – the Potsdam conference and threatened labor
102
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strikes – as well as the need to foster an image as a legitimate national president. Those issues
may have inclined Truman to name a Republican to help unify the nation and to win support for
other initiatives.105 Kennedy could not risk antagonizing powerful senators by nominating Judge
Hastie nor sacrifice Goldberg during the strike negotiations.
Electoral considerations may affect appointments on the eve of a presidential campaign.
Although a coming election may have influenced Hoover and Ford to name “noncontroversial
moderate[s],” Cardozo and Stevens respectively, 106 on other occasions presidential politics
pointed a president in a different direction. Theodore Roosevelt’s 1903 appointment of William
R. Day, who had been a close adviser to President McKinley, may have been Roosevelt’s effort
to curry favor with an important wing of the party. Some saw Taft’s nomination of Mahlon
Pitney, Chancellor of New Jersey, in February, 1912, as a move to help in his contest with
Theodore Roosevelt for the Republican nomination.107
Woodrow Wilson’s 1916 designation of Louis Brandeis was probably influenced by a
need to unite progressive support behind the Democratic ticket. Wilson had won a three way
race in 1912 when Taft and former President Theodore Roosevelt together attracted nearly 60%
of the vote. By 1916, it appeared unlikely that Roosevelt would compete against the Republican
nominee and accordingly Wilson could not again expect a split to allow him to prevail with a
minority vote. Democrats needed to attract new support and Wilson thought Brandeis could
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appeal to Republican progressives. The Brandeis nomination was “the first public sign of
[Wilson’s] new departure,” wrote his biographer, Arthur S. Link. The nomination was “an open
defiance of and a personal affront to” big business and Taft supporters but it rallied Progressives
to Wilson.108
Eisenhower weighed political factors in nominating Brennan in 1956, a presidential
election year. Upon being notified in early September, 1956, of Justice Minton’s plan to retire,
Eisenhower instructed Brownell to look for a Catholic and a conservative Democrat as a
replacement. Brennan was a Democrat, a Catholic and from New Jersey.109
These examples illustrate that the timing of a vacancy matters because of its interaction
with other items on a president’s agenda. Sometimes other matters take priority.
G). Presidents’ Past Conduct
A president’s past actions may also circumscribe options. Having justified his Courtpacking plan as a remedy for the shortcomings of judicial septuagenarians,110 Franklin Roosevelt
could hardly select Judge Learned Hand for the Court in the 1940s since Hand was past 70.
Theodore Roosevelt postponed naming his friend, William Moody, to the Court in 1902. Having
recently named Holmes of Massachusetts, Roosevelt did not think he could name Moody, also of
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Massachusetts, to the second vacancy (although he did appoint him to the third).111 Similarly,
John Kennedy claimed he passed over Paul A. Freund for Whittaker’s seat because he had
already appointed too many Harvard men to high office.112
A president’s prior Supreme Court selections also help shape the context of each new
nomination. Unmet claims intensify demands the next time. By 1956, Eisenhower had twice
failed to fill the “Catholic” seat, had named two Republicans to the Court and had elevated no
state court judges. Minton’s retirement provided an opportunity to address those issues, and
Eisenhower achieved a trifecta by appointing Brennan, a Catholic, Democratic, state judge.
A predecessor’s conduct may also shape the context. Eisenhower had criticized Roosevelt
and Truman for appointing political or personal friends. After appointing Warren, Eisenhower
stated a preference for those with prior judicial experience to demonstrate a commitment to merit
over ideology or cronyism.113 Similarly, Nixon claimed that the controversy over Fortas’s
relationship with Johnson convinced him to avoid personal or political friends.114
H). Representation and Demography
Demographic characteristics have also constrained presidential action. Geography and
religion were once most prominent; more recently, they have largely disappeared as criteria
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while gender, race and ethnicity have emerged as more relevant diversity considerations. The
particulars may change yet demography constrains presidential choice.
Presidents traditionally considered geographic balance, a practice which traced to the
nineteenth century when justices rode circuit and when state or sectional identities loomed
large.115 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. of Massachusetts owed his appointment in part to the
fortuity that Justice Horace Gray, also of Massachusetts, retired. Holmes’s presence on the
bench almost prevented Theodore Roosevelt from nominating Moody since he also came from
Massachusetts.116 Hoover justified his nomination of Judge Parker since the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit had not been represented on the Court for 70 years.117 Hoover questioned
whether he could nominate Cardozo in 1932 since two New Yorkers—Charles Evans Hughes
and Stone—were on the Court. 118 Geography was deemed a sufficient constraint that Stone
offered to resign to make way for Cardozo119 and the New York Times story reporting Cardozo’s
appointment proclaimed that geography had been “ignored.”120
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When Franklin Roosevelt met with Judge Wiley Rutledge, he exclaimed, “Wiley, you
have a lot of geography!”121 Indeed, he did. Rutledge was born in Kentucky, raised there and in
North Carolina and Tennessee, educated in Tennessee and Wisconsin, taught in public schools in
Colorado, Indiana and New Mexico and at law schools in Colorado, Missouri and Iowa.122
Notwithstanding Rutledge’s rich geographic pedigree, FDR deferred nominating him until his
last vacancy.
Geography was not, however, an absolute constraint. Theodore Roosevelt ignored it in
nominating Moody as Wilson did a decade later in selecting Brandeis. And Hoover named
Cardozo even though two New Yorkers were already on the Court.
Nixon, who generally appointed southerners, was the last president to take geography
seriously. It has more recently become irrelevant. Clinton considered Babbitt when the Court
already had two members from Arizona (Rehnquist and O’Connor) and one from California
(Kennedy). George W. Bush filled the vacancies created when Rehnquist died and O’Connor
retired with federal judges sitting on the D.C. and Third Circuits respectively. The current Court
includes four justices who served on the D.C. Circuit, one each from the First, Second, and Third
Circuits, and Kagan from Massachusetts. Only Justice Kennedy had significant adult
involvement with America west of the Mississippi River.
Religion was a factor during much of the twentieth century. Pierce Butler was
recommended, and presumably appointed, in part because Harding thought the Court should
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have a Catholic member.123 Frank Murphy, also a Catholic succeeded Butler, and when Murphy
died, some speculated that Truman would name another Catholic124 Truman, however, was
annoyed at the Catholic hierarchy and was disinclined to perpetuate the Catholic seat.125 When
he summoned Tom Clark and Senator J. Howard McGrath, both assumed he would name the
Catholic McGrath to the Court. Truman surprised them with his intent to nominate Clark to the
Court and McGrath as attorney general.126 Seven years later, Eisenhower restored the Catholic
seat when he appointed Brennan, and the Court has always included at least one Catholic since
then.
Brandeis became the first Jew to serve on the Court in 1916 and Cardozo joined him in
1930. The Cardozo seat became the “Jewish seat” and was held successively by Frankfurter,
Goldberg and Fortas. Nixon, however, denounced the notion that a nominee should be appointed
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due to his religion127 although his view that Jews were too liberal and would not support him was
his real motive.128
Religion has become less prominent as a reason for, or against, appointment. There was
little, if any, discussion of religion as a reason to appoint Ginsburg, Breyer or Kagan and the fact
that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito and Sotomayor are
Catholic did not apparently influence their selections.129
Nixon defended his decision to name two white men to the Court in 1971 on the grounds
that a Court of only nine justices could not reflect every demographic group.130 Nixon’s premise
that a Court consisting of nine men (eight of whom were white) was demographically
representative was under some assault in 1971 and is anachronistic today.
Race, gender, and ethnicity have recently emerged as significant demographic factors.
Kennedy seriously considered naming Hastie in 1962 before Johnson nominated Thurgood
Marshall five years later. Not coincidentally, the first President Bush nominated an AfricanAmerican, Thomas, to Marshall’s seat.
Although Reagan’s nomination of O’Connor represented the first of five women
nominated for the Court, presidents began to consider gender diversity earlier. Nixon considered
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appointing a woman in 1971.131 Nixon opined on September 25, 1971 that “he really should go
for a woman judge if we can get a good, tough conservative” since such a move would produce
“tremendous political mileage.”132 First Lady Pat Nixon engaged in “cogent and determined
lobbying on every available occasion” for a woman justice133 and apparently was furious when
Nixon named two men.134 Ford included Secretary of Housing and Urban Affairs Carla Hills
and Judge Cornelia G. Kennedy on the list he submitted to the ABA.135 Reagan considered
promoting O’Connor to chief justice.136 His successor, Bush, interviewed Judge Edith Jones
when he named Souter.137 Clinton and George W. Bush nominated Ginsburg and Miers
respectively. Obama’s entire short list consisted of four eminently qualified women before
choosing Sotomayor, and he considered several women (in addition to men) before choosing
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Kagan. Similarly, Obama’s three predecessors considered, but passed over, prospective Hispanic
nominees.138
I.)

The Seat Being Vacated

Presidents face constraints based upon the characteristics of the justice in the vacated
seat. These considerations may relate to stature, demography, or ideology. Holmes’s retirement
prompted the suggestion that his eminence required a successor of great distinction. As Andrew
Kaufman put it, “a giant should be replaced by a giant,” a formula which favored Cardozo.139
Roberts’s retirement in 1945 put greater pressure on Truman to name a Republican than would
have been the case had Murphy or Rutledge left.
The ideological characteristics of the departing justice may also influence the choice of a
successor. Although Reagan initially nominated Bork, a conservative ideologue, to replace
Powell, the Court’s swing vote, after Bork’s defeat he eventually chose Kennedy, whose
philosophy was more nuanced. Yet George W. Bush nominated conservative jurists John Roberts
and ultimately Alito to replace O’Connor, the swing vote of the Rehnquist Court.
Bush’s response to the O’Connor vacancy also suggests that presidents have not always
felt totally confined by demographic claims to particular seats. He nominated two men and only
one woman to replace O’Connor, the first, and, at the time, one of only two, women justices.
Similarly, Wilson appointed Brandeis to replace Lamar, a Georgian, even though only two
justices came from the south and Brandeis’s Kentucky ties were somewhat attenuated after more
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than three decades in Boston, a city which already claimed Holmes.140 Harding felt compelled to
maintain the Catholic seat yet Truman did not. Roosevelt perpetuated a Jewish seat, as did
Kennedy and Johnson, but Nixon did not.
J). Campaigns for the Court
Campaigns for Supreme Court seats constitute part of the context which confronts a
president. Perhaps no figure campaigned more vigorously for the Court than did Taft.141 His
quest apparently began when he was a young state court judge in Ohio and continued through
discussions with Presidents McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt by which time Taft’s ambitions
had fixed on the center seat.142 Even after the conservative Taft lost the presidency to Wilson, a
progressive Democrat, Taft apparently hoped Wilson would name him to the Court.143 Taft’s
campaign continued after Harding’s election in 1920 as Taft and his friends lobbied Harding and
his associates to appoint the former president chief justice.144 Taft’s former Secretary of War
Jacob M. Dickinson visited Chief Justice White to discuss White’s retirement and Taft asked
White’s physician about the Chief Justice’s health.145 After White died in May, 1921, Taft
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associates pressed Attorney General Daugherty to persuade Harding to name Taft, and Harding
soon agreed to do so.146
Although Frankfurter portrayed his appointment as a surprise,147 his friends campaigned
vigorously on his behalf, writing to senators of Frankfurter’s merit and disparaging potential
rivals. Senator George Norris endorsed Frankfurter as did important New Dealers like Harry
Hopkins, Henry Ickes and Robert Jackson; Justice Stone, along with Jackson, urged that
Frankfurter could counterbalance Chief Justice Hughes.148
Following Vinson’s death, Warren and his associates worked to advance his prospects for
the seat which he believed Eisenhower had promised him. Concerned that some would push for
a Catholic justice, Warren and his colleagues contacted members of the Church hierarchy to seek
their support. Warren also contacted influential friends in both parties.149
Burger assiduously courted Nixon at the beginning of his term. Ehrlichman wrote that
Burger “wanted a seat on the Supreme Court so passionately that he would have agreed to almost
anything to get it.”150 Burger asked Brownell to approach Nixon on his behalf.151 When Burger
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came to the White House to swear in some presidential appointees, he brought a speech he had
given on law and order. Thereafter, he frequently sent Ehrlichman notes and articles. Burger not
only persuaded Nixon and Mitchell of his commitment to law and order and to undoing parts of
the Warren Court’s jurisprudence, he also said he would resign as Chief Justice before Nixon left
office so Nixon could appoint his successor.152
Campaigns occur against candidates, too. Jackson’s detractors worked to deny him
elevation to chief justice.153 Some in the Reagan justice department worked to derail Kennedy’s
nomination, telling conservative senators that Reagan was deciding between Kennedy and that
senator’s favorite candidate. The strategy apparently induced some “Anybody but Kennedy”
calls to the White House.154
On one occasion, Hoover’s choice of Cardozo in 1932, a nomination followed
widespread and apparently spontaneous clamor for a selection without the prospective
beneficiary’s involvement. Cardozo’s admirers mounted a full-scale effort which overcame a
number of demographic obstacles.155
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Whether the vacancy is publicly known affects a president’s freedom of action. Although
vacancies created by death will be apparent, some justices have provided presidents with
advance notice of their retirement, allowing the president to limit unwanted advice by
suppressing news of the vacancy.
Kennedy, for instance, allowed little time to elapse between the public disclosure of a
vacancy and his selections. News of Whittaker’s resignation did not leak until March 29, 1962 at
which point the administration had known of it for several weeks.156 Kennedy revealed his
choice of White the following day.157 Kennedy announced Frankfurter’s retirement and
Goldberg’s nomination simultaneously, both of which were apparently known to few
administration officials.158 The secrecy prevented outsiders from advocating favored candidates.
McGeorge Bundy later observed that “one of the things I admire about Bobby [Kennedy] is that
when it came to Supreme Court appointments he always kept the very existence of the vacancy
so tight that nobody else had a chance to get their advice in except Sorensen and me in a couple
of cases, and our advice never got taken.”159 Similarly, Stewart and Burger gave the Reagan
administration advance notice of their retirements, allowing it to pursue a replacement without
public discussion. By contrast, Holmes’s retirement triggered lobbying on different sides.160
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K). Concluding Words on Contextual Constraints
The foregoing discussion suggests a range of contextual factors shape selection of
Supreme Court nominees. The constitutional allocation of power gives the president an
advantage. The senate may reject, but cannot dictate, the choice. The president may submit a
second and a third name. The senate may find it difficult to continue deflecting presidential
nominees.161 Even so, the process imposes costs on the president. Defeats may harm his public
prestige or professional standing, alienate those whose help he may need in other battles, and
divert resources from other priorities. Senate composition is an important, but not the only,
contextual, influence. Presidents also consider the message the choice conveys about them and
its impact on a range of objectives. Past commitments, whether political, or personal, constrain
choice. So, too, do strategic considerations geared towards other priorities or future campaigns.
IV. The Influence of Presidential Idiosyncrasy
Ultimately, one person makes each Supreme Court nomination. And, as presidential
scholar Fred I. Greenstein has pointed out, “the matter of who occupies the nation’s highest
office can have profound repercussions.”162 The personality, preferences, values and decisionmaking style of that individual inevitably affect the outcome.
Presidents seek to choose ideologically compatible justices but the evidence does not
support the suggestion that absent a confirmation constraint they choose the option who is
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philosophically closest. 163 It seems implausible, for instance, that Reagan chose Rehnquist,
Scalia and Bork in that order because that ranking matched their ideological similarity to him.
Similarly, the president’s party identification is clearly one, but by no means the only,
significant variable. McKinley had pledged to appoint Boston lawyer, Alfred Hemenway, to
Justice Gray’s seat when it became vacant but McKinley’s vice president, Theodore Roosevelt,
appointed Holmes instead.164 Roosevelt passed over Lurton in 1906 but three years later
Roosevelt’s chosen successor, Taft, nominated his former colleague.165 Truman selected Minton
who Franklin Roosevelt had disappointed. Truman knew of Roosevelt’s promise to make
Jackson chief justice but appointed Vinson. Lyndon Johnson certainly would not have selected
White and Kennedy would not have chosen Fortas or Thornberry. George H.W. Bush selected
Souter after Reagan did not.
In each case the president drew from a different pool and acted in a different context. But
each president also brought a different mix of experience, commitments, biases, values and
outlooks, had different biographical baggage, made decisions differently and listened to different
advisors. Each Supreme Court nomination is a personal decision which reflects the approach of
the president who makes it. In short, it matters who is president.
A). Policy Objectives and Judicial Philosophy
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Presidents typically use Court appointments to advance immediate policy objectives.166
These goals will vary depending on party identification, worldview and a host of other factors.
Taft had different objectives than did Theodore Roosevelt, Truman than FDR, Johnson than
Kennedy, Bush than Reagan. In part, the different contexts in which they acted affected the
saliency of particular issues and positions. Yet these pairs also saw the world differently and
occupied different places on the political spectrum notwithstanding their shared partisan
identification.
It is not surprising that presidents weigh short-term policy considerations in making
nominations.167 Presidents have greater stakes regarding decisions the Court might render during
their term(s) as opposed to those handed down in future decades. Moreover, they generally can
more accurately predict topics on the Court’s immediate docket than in the more remote future.
Theodore Roosevelt delayed appointing Holmes until reassured of his attitudes.168
Franklin Roosevelt sought justices who would not use restrictive interpretations of the
Commerce and Due Process Clauses to strike down New Deal legislation; all nine of his
nominees subscribed to doctrines which would accomplish Roosevelt’s desired ends.169 Nixon
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sought nominees sympathetic to his law and order agenda and against busing.170 George W.
Bush weighed the views of prospective candidates regarding presidential power.171
The broader judicial philosophy of prospective nominees also influences some
presidents.172 Not surprisingly, Democratic and Republican presidents seek justices with a
different orientation. Theodore Roosevelt wanted to appoint justices who followed Alexander
Hamilton and John Marshall, not Thomas Jefferson and John L. Calhoun.173 Eisenhower cited
Warren’s “middle of the road philosophy” as an important criterion.174 Nixon wanted justices
who shared his “strict constructionist” disposition, particularly a prospective nominee’s views on
law and order,175 a formulation Nixon used four times in an eight paragraph statement of criteria
for Court nominees.176 The “strict construction” nomenclature returned when George W. Bush
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announced that “I don't believe in liberal activist judges. I believe in strict constructionists.”177
Bush later praised Roberts, Miers and Alito as such.178
Not surprisingly, recent Democratic presidents have articulated different philosophical
concerns. When White’s retirement in 1993 created his first vacancy, Clinton said that in
addition to ability and experience he wanted someone with knowledge of “the problems of real
people, and someone with a big heart.”179 A few days later, he said that “I would like to put
someone on the Court who would make sure that there was a certain balance in the debate, that
there was a real feeling for the rights of ordinary Americans under the Constitution, but that also
someone who was hard-headed, who understood that the criminal law had to be enforced, that
you didn't want to over-legalize the country. There's a nice balance to be formed.”180 Obama,
famously and controversially, suggested his nominees should be empathetic among other
qualities.181
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Judicial philosophy seemed less critical for some other presidents.182 Truman and
Kennedy each had a relatively free hand regarding their nominations but neither focused on
judicial philosophy. Although they knew those they appointed, there is no indication that they
had any deep understanding of their judicial outlooks. And some presidents appointed justices
who they might have predicted would be dissimilar. Wilson appointed two progressive jurists,
Brandeis and Clarke, after naming McReynolds, one of the most reactionary members of the
Court. Wilson may not have anticipated the course of McReynold’s jurisprudence, but he surely
could have discovered that McReynolds and Brandeis were very different people.183
Although four Reagan choices – Rehnquist, Scalia, Bork and Ginsburg – reflected the
president’s stated brand of conservatism, his first and final nominees were less ideological.
Those involved in President Reagan’s search had warnings that O’Connor and Kennedy might
not toe a strict conservative line on abortion and privacy issues.184 Reagan may have felt
constrained to name Kennedy after the unsuccessful Bork and Ginsburg nominations but his
administration did not apply the same philosophical standards to O’Connor as to his other
choices.
Different presidents attach varying importance to Supreme Court nominations. Their
divergent views may affect their selection conduct. For Franklin Roosevelt (especially early on),
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Nixon, Reagan and George W. Bush, the composition of the Court heavily impacted policy areas
of critical importance to them or their supporters. Their choices were generally designed to
further those objectives to the extent possible. Others, such as Truman or Kennedy, assigned less
weight to the work of the Court. Their relative indifference reflected a combination of personal
disposition and the press of other business.185 Truman, Kennedy, Ford, the first Bush, Clinton
and Obama sometimes acted as if they did not want Court nominations to interfere with other
objectives. Katzenbach, for instance, said that Kennedy took his two Supreme Court
nominations “very seriously” but that the President did not regard the Court as “a really co-equal
branch” and accordingly did not view Court appointments as seriously as he might have done.186
B)

Friends

Some Presidents were disposed to nominate personal or political friends, either to reward
past service or with the expectation that friends will discharge judicial functions as the president
would like. Theodore Roosevelt offered his third vacancy to Taft, his former Attorney General
Philander Knox, and Secretary of State Elihu Root before Moody accepted.187 Friendship
apparently inspired Taft to appoint Lurton. Harding named his close friend, Sutherland,188 and
Coolidge nominated his attorney general, and Amherst contemporary, Stone. Franklin Roosevelt
had close relationships with virtually all of his nominees. Black and Byrnes were senate
supporters, Reed, Douglas, Murphy and Jackson served in his administration, and Frankfurter
was a close, external adviser.
185
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Truman, however, provided the poster example of a president inclined to cronyism in his
appointments. His nominees—Burton, Vinson, Clark and Minton --were close friends. He had
served in the senate with Burton and Minton and played poker with Cabinet members Vinson
and Clark.
Similarly, Kennedy appointed two officials from his administration, White and Goldberg,
and passed over one eminently qualified potential justice, Freund, who had declined a high
administration position.189 Johnson nominated his close friend, Fortas, twice, another Texas
crony, Thornberry, and Solicitor General Marshall.
Conversely sometimes presidents do not appoint insiders to keep them in the
administration. Harding did not wish to lose Secretary of State Hughes when White died190 and
Hoover may have passed over Mitchell to retain him in the cabinet.191

Truman ruled out

Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson because the senate was investigating war time
procurements, a matter within Patterson’s portfolio.192 Kennedy was not prepared to lose
Goldberg when Whittaker resigned.193
Other Presidents have thought it bad practice to appoint close associates. Eisenhower
implicitly, and Nixon explicitly, distanced themselves from their predecessors’ practice of
189
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choosing friends and insiders. Judge Richard Arnold’s Arkansas ties may have worked against
his selection by Clinton. Arnold was a jurist of rare distinction but Clinton, having been
criticized for appointing some Arkansas associates, may have been reluctant to elevate Arnold
even though they were not close friends.194
C)

Firsts

Some presidents seek to make historic nominations. Like a path-breaking vicepresidential nomination, such a selection may send positive messages about the president while
enhancing his legacy. Johnson wanted to appoint the first African-American justice and
orchestrated events to produce that result. He persuaded Marshall to leave the federal judiciary
to become solicitor general to enhance his resume. He engineered a Court vacancy by moving
Attorney General Katzenbach to undersecretary of state, identifying Deputy Attorney General
Ramsey Clark as Katzenbach’s likely successor, and confirming with Clark’s father, Justice
Clark, that his son’s promotion would trigger his resignation.195
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Having made a campaign commitment to appoint a woman, Reagan named O’Connor to
the first vacancy. Reagan was proud to appoint the first woman justice196 and labeled her
confirmation as “historic.”197 Reagan later was drawn to Scalia in part because of his Italian
heritage. Reagan was so anxious to nominate the first Italian-American justice that he ignored
arguments that it would be prudent to nominate the controversial Bork in 1986 while Reagan still
had a Republican majority in the Senate.198 Before Obama nominated the first Hispanic to the
Court, other presidents gave serious consideration to doing so.199
D) Sending a Message
Presidents often use a Supreme Court nomination to send a message about who they are
and what they value. Katzenbach recognized this aspect when he suggested that Kennedy’s first
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nominee especially should be someone “closely identified” with the president.200 Choosing a
“first” is one way a president can tie the administration to the American Dream, particularly if
the nominee’s life story presents a compelling narrative. Presidents like Johnson, Reagan and
Obama associated themselves with that concept through their appointments of Marshall,
O’Connor and Sotomayor respectively. Obama concluded his announcement of Sotomayor’s
nomination by underscoring this point:201
Well, Sonia, what you've shown in your life is that it doesn't matter where you
come from, what you look like, or what challenges life throws your way, no dream is
beyond reach in the United States of America.
And when Sonia Sotomayor ascends those marble steps to assume her seat on the highest
court in the land, America will have taken another important step towards realizing the
ideal that is etched above its entrance: Equal justice under the law.
Presidents use nominations to associate themselves with other values. Harding, Franklin
Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower each hoped a cross-party selection would foster their image
of bipartisanship. Wilson emphasized his progressive credentials through his 1916 nominations
of Brandeis especially and Clarke. Nixon used his judicial nominations to identify with law and
order themes; Hoover and George W. Bush connected themselves to excellence through their
appointments of Cardozo and Roberts. Clinton hoped to show competence by choosing nominees
who would win easy confirmation. The messages vary, but presidents invariably use Supreme
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Court nominations to sound themes helpful to their presidency or to avoid those which are
detrimental.
E)

Presidential Requirements

In addition to the inevitable recitation of the quality of prospective candidates as a central
factor,202 presidents also impose distinct criteria which channel their choices. Presidents have
viewed the age of prospective nominees differently. Taft advocated appointing younger justices,
a profile which fit four of his six appointees—Hughes (48), Van Devanter (51), Lamar (53) and
Pitney (54)-- but made exceptions to appoint his close friend, Lurton (65) and to elevate White
(65) as Chief Justice, which, as will be suggested, may have had other appeal to Taft.
Eisenhower imposed a 62 year old limit with some flexibility.203 Nixon wanted to appoint
justices likely to serve at least ten years. He said that apart from Rehnquist’s “unquestioned
legal qualifications and his moderately conservative philosophy” his “most attractive attribute
was his age” (47).204 That John Roberts was a decade younger than Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson
worked in his favor.205 Those Clinton considered were in the 55 to 60 range.
Some Presidents have expressed, or acted upon, a preference for appointing sitting
federal judges. Taft, Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and both Bushes thought this experience
highly relevant. Others generally avoided judges—Franklin Roosevelt and Kennedy, for
202
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instance—or suggested that the Court needed other experience. George H.W. Bush emphasized
Souter’s long experience on the state bench.206 Clinton wanted to appoint a politician and
George W. Bush suggested that Miers’s lack of judicial background was an advantage.207
F) Presidential Personality
Presidents are human beings and accordingly their unique personalities affect their
decisions.208 It is not simply that psychology influences a president’s choice of friends and
advisors, that John Kennedy was friendly with White and relied on his brother, Robert Kennedy,
whereas Lyndon Johnson was drawn to Fortas and despised RFK. Personality also affects how
presidents react to different people, whether they are combative or conciliatory, whether they
feel bound by promises, how intensely they engage in the process.
Harding was a compliant person who was susceptible to the influence of Taft, who he
greatly admired, and Daugherty.209 They could shape his Court nominations. By contrast,
Franklin Roosevelt knew his choice of Black would upset some senators who resented Black’s
strong support for Roosevelt’s court packing plan. That anticipated reaction apparently appealed
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to Roosevelt.210 Reagan knew Bork would draw opposition, yet was confident he could sway
senators to support the ill-fated choice.211 Other presidents were more conflict-averse.
Whether consciously or not, presidents sometimes look for justices who fit their selfperception. Nixon praised Burger as someone who received his education the “hard way.” “He
went to law school at night and worked during the daytime, but he made a brilliant academic
record.”212 Those words could have appeared in Nixon’s own biography. George H. W. Bush
may have been drawn to Souter, who shared his Ivy League education and New England
upbringing.
Clinton did not set out to name a woman when he nominated Ginsburg but ultimately
concluded that she was his best available choice. When they met, he was particularly drawn to
her,213 his earlier meeting with Breyer having not gone well. A year later, Clinton was more
disposed to Breyer.214
H). Leadership Style; Participants and Persuaders
A president’s decision-making style may impact selection.215 Eisenhower, Reagan and
George W. Bush delegated extensive authority. They generally allowed subordinates great
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latitude to shape their options. By contrast, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Johnson, Clinton and
Obama became more personally involved, although in different ways. Roosevelt, Truman, and
Johnson knew those they nominated quite well. Clinton did not, but he involved himself heavily
in the process, insisting on additional names and devoting considerable time to meeting with
prospective nominees.216
How a president organizes the search and who, if anyone, has his ear matters. Some
presidents have relied on the justice department or attorney general. Others assign responsibility
to the White House staff, especially the counsel, and at times the vice president and chief of staff.
Some consult with important senators or justices. Some keep their own counsel. Some
presidents encourage public discussion to vet candidates and test reactions. And some combine
the various models. The nature of, and participants in, the process, and their relative influence
structure the president’s options and influence his decision.
Johnson made selections without much consultation, and often ignored advice he did
receive. Johnson asked Katzenbach to generate a list of potential replacements for Goldberg after
appointing him Ambassador to the United Nations, but Katzenbach thought the exercise a waste
of time since he was convinced from the outset Johnson would choose Fortas.217
Johnson’s approach worked when he had a compliant senate but it helped produce the
Fortas-Thornberry debacle. Johnson conceived the plan to nominate Fortas as chief justice and
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the obscure218 Thornberry to Fortas’ seat shortly after learning of Warren’s plan to retire. 219
Johnson said he had conferred with the senate and anticipated no problem,220 but his
consultations were a charade. After Republican minority leader Dirksen suggested several names
the very day Johnson received Warren’s letter, Johnson raised Fortas as a possibility and secured
Dirksen’s qualified support.221 But Senator James Eastland, chairman of the senate judiciary
committee, advised against Fortas.222 He promised to let the nomination come out of committee
but told Johnson it would be “terribly unpopular” and would not be confirmed.223 Leading
Republicans immediately opposed any appointment by Johnson.224 Johnson’s Secretary of
Defense Clark Clifford warned Johnson that the Republicans might oppose the Fortas-
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Thornberry tandem and unsuccessfully urged Johnson to appoint a Republican to Fortas’s seat.225
Johnson’s failure to engage in meaningful soundings cost him the appointment.
In earlier times the attorney general often influenced the selection either due to his close
relationship to the president or, during the first half of the twentieth century, from lack of
alternative capacity in the White House. Eisenhower’s attorneys generals played the leading role
in the nominations of Brownell’s close friend, John Marshall Harlan II,226 of Brennan227 and of
Potter Stewart.228 Nixon relied on Mitchell, his former law partner and campaign manager, to
identify nominees for the first two vacancies229 but involved others after the HaynsworthCarswell defeats. Ford listened to Attorney General Edward Levi who gave Stevens his highest
praise.230 And Attorney General William French Smith played the crucial role in selecting
O’Connor for the first vacancy. Smith and his associates generated the initial list of, and reports
on, candidates and Smith lobbied for O’Connor for more than a month before Reagan chose
her.231 Although Reagan involved his White House chief of staff and counsel in subsequent
225
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nominations, the Justice Department also played a critical role in the decisions to nominate
Rehnquist, Scalia, Bork and Ginsburg.232
The unique role of the attorney general in structuring options and influencing decisions
was particularly evident during the Kennedy administration when Whittaker retired. John and
Robert Kennedy initially turned to Byron White, deputy attorney general, for guidance, a natural
move in view of White’s official position and service as law clerk to Chief Justice Vinson.
White involved his friend and subordinate, Katzenbach, who gave Hastie’s work measured
reviews233 and, in White’s absence from Washington, included White on the list sent to President
Kennedy. White was selected. 234 Robert Kennedy’s relationship with his brother helped
prevent Freund’s appointment. Freund enjoyed considerable support among important advisers
including White House counsel Theodore C. Sorensen, Bundy, and Clifford;235 Katzenbach also
thought highly of Freund.236 But Robert Kennedy opposed Freund who had declined
appointment as Solicitor General.237
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The more recent institutionalization of the White House staff, especially a large counsel’s
office, has shifted the dominant role there.238 The change began during the Nixon administration
when, following the Haynsworth and Carswell vetting failures, Nixon ran a parallel process from
the White House and ultimately rejected Mitchell’s suggestions.239 When Nixon’s search for
successors to Black and Harlan floundered, the intervention of various White House aides on
behalf of Rehnquist proved critical.240 Clinton’s process was also run from the White House as
Attorney General Janet Reno played little apparent role.241 Clinton received input from a wide
range of people in a process which no one or few associates dominated.
Many recent presidents have relied on a hybrid process with input from the justice
department and the White House staff. The search for a successor to Justice Powell is illustrative.
The White House received about 24 hours notice of Powell’s decision to retire. At a hastily
convened Oval Office meeting including Chief of Staff Howard Baker, White House counsel
A.B. Culvahouse and justice department representatives, Reagan directed that Bork, who had
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been “a close second” for Scalia’s seat, be included on the list.242 Reagan was clearly “leaning
toward Bork” but others pushed for Kennedy or Judge Laurence Silberman; Senator Rudman
lobbied for Souter. Many in the administration thought it Bork’s turn, a view Reagan shared.243
He understood Bork might face opposition yet was confident he could persuade senators to
support him.244 Not anticipating decisive opposition to Bork, Baker, Meese and Culvahouse told
Reagan there was no reason not to choose Bork if that was his wish.245
After Bork’s defeat, the justice department and White House counsel’s office prepared
new lists.246 Baker and Culvahouse favored Kennedy who they thought would be a compelling
witness with broad support. Meese and others in the justice department pushed for their former
colleague, Ginsburg, who Baker and Culvahouse thought would be controversial.247 Reagan’s
long-time lawyer, former Attorney General Smith, convinced Reagan to select Ginsburg before
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Baker and Culvahouse could meet with Reagan to say “Anthony Kennedy.”248 After Ginsburg
withdrew conservatives in the justice department agreed to accept Kennedy’s nomination.249
Reagan’s successor, Bush, also used a hybrid process with input from White House
counsel Boyden Gray, the justice department and Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, and
White House Chief of Staff John Sununu. Although Gray was disposed to recommend Solicitor
General (and former Judge) Kenneth Starr for the Brennan seat, Thornburgh deemed Starr
unacceptable reflecting opposition from others in the justice department to their colleague’s
advancement. Ultimately, Souter, with strong backing from Sununu and Senator Warren
Rudman, emerged as Bush’s choice.250
George W. Bush empowered a committee of Vice President Cheney, Chief of Staff
Andrew Card, Miers, Gonzales, Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove, and vice presidential chief of
staff Scooter Libby.251 It interviewed prospective candidates at Cheney’s residence and prepared
a short list of five candidates who Bush interviewed over three days after reviewing material on
11 prospective choices.252 Roberts and Alito were at the top of the list.
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Whereas Johnson had essentially ignored the senate, Clinton took the advice of key
senators seriously. Republican Senator Orrin Hatch helped dissuade him from appointing
Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt by suggesting that nomination would provoke a battle
whereas Ginsburg or Breyer would be easily confirmed.253
The ultimate decision is accordingly affected by the president’s idiosyncrasies, by the
preferences of his advisers and their interaction with him. Who has the president’s ear affects
decisions. Brownell and Rogers were largely responsible for three of Eisenhower’s five
nominees. Robert Kennedy pushed White and blocked Freund. Rehnquist owed his initial
nomination to White House aides. Ford’s heavy reliance on Levi enhanced Stevens’s chances.
Rudman and Sununu helped produce the Souter nomination. Clinton kept the process alive until
Ginsburg emerged as a strong late candidate. Conversely, FDR, Truman, and Johnson largely
relied on their own judgment as did Bush in choosing Miers. The president’s decision-making
style and the predilections of those he involves determine the choice.
I). The Anatomy of a Nomination: Taft and Choosing a Chief Justice
No president navigated through more byzantine personal considerations than did
President Taft when the chief justiceship fell vacant in 1910. That position, more than the
presidency, was Taft’s highest ambition. Taft knew Chief Justice Fuller’s health was failing.
When Taft offered Hughes nomination as associate justice in 1910 he intimated that he might
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later name Hughes to succeed Fuller although Taft and Hughes both said no commitment was
made.254
When Fuller died soon thereafter, Hughes was widely mentioned as his likely successor.
Taft’s friends, Justices Lurton and Day, told Hughes they favored him and Holmes thought
Hughes the likely nominee. Justices Harlan and White, the most senior justices, also sought the
honor. Hughes was invited to meet with Taft on December 11, 1910 but, as he prepared to leave
for the White House 30 minutes later, a second call cancelled the appointment. The following
day Taft named White.255
Perhaps Taft thought White the more meritorious choice. Hughes’s biographer, Merlo
Pusey, wrote that a delegation of senators persuaded Taft that the other justices would oppose
Hughes’s elevation given his youth and recent appointment and that naming Hughes would upset
Taft’s former friend, but increasingly his rival, Theodore Roosevelt.256 The other justices may
254
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have sent word that they preferred White. Alternatively, Alpheus Mason suggested that Taft
may have seen White’s nomination as a way to court the Catholic vote for 1912.257
Others suggest a different explanation. Appointment of Hughes would likely foreclose
Taft’s chance of ever becoming chief justice. Mortality tables made the 65 year old White a
more appealing choice. Henry Abraham writes: “And the more the president pondered Hughes’s
48 years and excellent health, the less convinced he became that he should promote him—after
all, it was the post Taft wanted for himself.”258 In appointing a Catholic and a Democrat, Mason
suggests Taft might establish a precedent for a Democratic president to name a Republican
Protestant like Taft. Although noble motives may have influenced the decision, Mason
concludes in appointing White Taft “overlooked no contingency that might improve his own
chances of winning the office which, in his mind, ranked above that of President.”259
J). Conclusions on Presidential Idiosyncrasy
Although Taft’s predicament was sufficiently extraordinary to defy repetition, the story
illustrates that presidential personality and ambition affects Court choice. That should not
surprise. America invests enormous resources in choosing a president due to the widespread
belief that it matters who holds that position. One would expect the identity of the president to
affect who is nominated to the Court. The various approaches, outlooks, temperament, likes and
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dislikes of different presidents make it impossible to ignore the impact of presidential
idiosyncrasy.
V.

A Taxonomy of Supreme Court Nominations

This sketch of considerations which have shaped Supreme Court nominations since 1900
counsels a skeptical view of efforts to reduce the enterprise to scientific explanations. Surely
Professor Nemacheck is correct that presidents act strategically and prefer to nominate those who
are ideologically agreeable and likely to be confirmed.260 Yet those objectives sometimes yield
to others. The reality a president encounters, and the person who encounters it, varies from
choice to choice. Selection turns on the interaction between pool, context and idiosyncrasy and
each factor consists of various components.
Of course, presidents are likely to choose candidates with a compatible philosophy yet it
seems dubious to suggest that, absent confirmation restraints, they will necessarily try to choose
the option who is most “ideologically compatible.”261 Constructing such a measure and locating
the president and those on the short list is a problematic enterprise. Franklin Roosevelt had a free
hand yet one cannot plausibly conclude that he was more “ideologically compatible” with Black
than with Reed, with Reed over Frankfurter, with Frankfurter over Douglas, and so on. All
agreed with him on the issues which concerned him. Later when they encountered constitutional
questions beyond FDR’s agenda, Black and Douglas wound up being closer ideologically than
either was to Reed or Frankfurter. Nixon chose Powell and Rehnquist from the same pool but
not because they were the two options closest to him ideologically.
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Even if a reliable measure existed to compare a president’s judicial philosophy to those of
prospective nominees, contextual factors other than ideological similarity and confirmability
affect the choice. Facing a difficult reelection campaign, Wilson needed help from progressives.
Far from exalting confirmability, he invited a battle by choosing the controversial Brandeis to
solidify and broaden his base. Brandeis may have resembled him ideologically, but how can one
conclude that ideology, not politics, dictated the choice?
Nor is it plausible to believe that Harding chose Taft, Hoover chose Hughes, FDR chose
Stone, and Eisenhower chose Warren because they were ideological twins. Each nominee was a
formidable figure. Harding, Hoover and Eisenhower wanted to appease a powerful Republican
leader and coopt his supporters, Eisenhower had a promise to keep and FDR wanted to model
bipartisanship to unite a country facing war. Surely Roosevelt did not feel ideologically closer to
Stone than to Jackson, the confidante to whom he had promised the position. Truman thought
bipartisanship important at the beginning of his term and named Republican Burton. Absent the
coming war might FDR have elevated Jackson and Truman have chosen someone else, perhaps
poor Schwellenbach?
Nixon chose Haynsworth, Carswell, Powell and Rehnquist to reward southern support in
1968 and cultivate it for 1972 even though other choices would have been more confirmable
(than all but Powell). Reagan had a public commitment to choose a woman; that constraint, not
ideological compatibility or confirmability, helped dictate the O’Connor choice coupled with her
support from some who had the president’s ear. O’Connor may have been closer to Reagan
ideologically than other women on the list but one suspects that Reagan might have found Paul
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Laxalt or William Clark a closer ideological soul mate as well as friend.262 Harding had a
promise to Sutherland, Truman to Minton, Eisenhower to Warren, Kennedy to Goldberg.
Idiosyncrasy, too, affects selection. Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson tended to
choose friends or insiders whereas Hoover, Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan largely favored
outsiders. Even beyond these contrasting inclinations, the simple chemistry, or lack thereof,
between two people may make a difference. Reagan hit it off with O’Connor, Rehnquist, and
Scalia, George H.W. Bush did with Souter. Breyer’s meeting with Clinton went poorly, which
created an opening for Ginsburg who had been low on Clinton’s list. Her meeting went well,
Cuomo withdrew and she was selected.
Harding, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy kept their promises to Sutherland, Minton,
Warren and Goldberg but Truman did not keep his pledge to Schwellenbach. Did Truman regard
promises, or that promise, differently than did the others? Or did further exposure convince him
that, whereas Minton was worthy Schwellenbach was not?
Different presidents react to the same conduct in different ways. FDR did not keep
Frankfurter off the Court for declining to serve as Solicitor General; Kennedy, at the urgency of
his brother, did deny Freund. Did that different treatment reflect differing temperament of the
two presidents, their different relationships with the two Harvard law professors, the
extraordinary influence of one president’s brother or the fact that Frankfurter received FDR’s
third appointment whereas JFK only made two?

262

Cf. NEMACHECK, supra note 5, at 11–13 (suggesting O’Connor’s gender insufficient explanation given presence
of other women on short list), 152–53 (providing names of those considered).

76

The nominations any president makes may not follow a consistent pattern. Theodore
Roosevelt had no relationship with Holmes or Day but Moody was his attorney general and close
friend. Wilson appointed Brandeis, one of the greatest justices as well as McReynolds, a bigoted
reactionary. Wilson knew McReynolds and Brandeis but not his third nominee, Clarke.
Eisenhower appointed an eminent politician and four sitting federal judges.

George W. Bush

nominated two relatively young conservative federal judges with imposing credentials, neither of
whom he knew well, and Miers, his long-time friend and lawyer, whose qualifications were
modest and whose conservative credentials were suspect. In explaining the Miers choice, Bush
celebrated the fact that she was not a judge, but his other two nominees came from the federal
bench and Alito had served 11 years in that role.263
Such seemingly inconsistent behavior by the same president should not really surprise.
The pool changes each time. Even when presidents repeatedly consider many of the same
candidates, as did Franklin Roosevelt or Reagan or George W. Bush, for instance, the pool
always lacks the person(s) previously chosen.
Moreover, inconsistent behavior may reflect changing context. Wilson faced different
constraints in 1914 when he chose McReynolds, than he did two years later when he selected
Brandeis. Eisenhower had a promise to fulfill and was naming a chief justice when he named
Warren at the beginning of his term. Thereafter, he wanted to dissociate himself from the
conduct of his predecessor by selecting judges with whom he lacked any chose relationship.
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Finally, presidents may act inconsistently because they change their mind regarding what
factors are important. Or they may value several different criteria and simply strike the balance
differently at different times as the pool and context changes.
And at times the reasons for selection may be inscrutable. Why, for instance, did
Roosevelt nominate Frankfurter to the third vacancy after telling him he was committed to
naming a westerner after having replaced westerner Sutherland with southerner Reed? Was it
because Roosevelt’s associates persuaded him Frankfurter could do intellectual battle with
Hughes? Was it because Roosevelt’s first two appointees, Black and Reed, seemed political
partisans of mediocre legal ability whereas Frankfurter would add luster to the Court? Did
Roosevelt wish to make a gesture to Jewish Americans at a time when he was unresponsive to
the Zionist effort to create a Jewish state or to mounting evidence of Nazi genocide? Was it
because Cardozo’s seat was vacant and Brandeis’s health was failing so Frankfurter’s
appointment would not place two Jewish men from Massachusetts on the Court for long? Was it
because Roosevelt and Frankfurter were friends and the President appreciated his loyalty?264
Obama’s two choices demonstrate the variability of presidential behavior. He nominated
Judge Sonia Sotomayor and Solicitor General Elena Kagan to fill the first two Supreme Court
vacancies which occurred during his term. Both are women, both are lawyers, both have
imposing credentials including Ivy League pedigree. There the easily discernible relevant
similarities end.
Sotomayor was a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
had been on the federal bench for 17 years, more than any first time appointee to the Supreme
264

See PARRISH, supra note 148, at 276–78.

78

Court. By contrast, Kagan had no judicial experience, a hole in her resume which distinguished
her also from the 12 immediately preceding persons confirmed for the Court. Obama had known
Kagan for nearly two decades and had appointed her to a high governmental position; he met
Sotomayor shortly before choosing her. Sotomayor was a “first,” the first Hispanic named to
the Court; Kagan was not a “first” and her ethnic group, Jewish-Americans, already was overrepresented according to some observers.265
Obama chose Sotomayor and Kagan in unique political contexts which differed from
those in which his predecessors acted and from each other. Sotomayor was the first nominee of a
new president, barely four months in office. He had high approval ratings and faced a senate
consisting of 59 (soon to be 60 with the seating of Senator Al Franken) Democrats but one
whose Republican members had proven willing to filibuster nominees. He had an ambitious
legislative agenda and faced a daunting array of international and domestic crises. These other
demands made Obama averse to committing extensive political capital to a nomination battle.
As the first African-American president, Obama was a metaphor for the American Dream and
for opening doors to groups previously excluded from leadership positions. His predecessor had
recently nominated a man to fill the vacancy created by the retirement of O’Connor, one of the
two women justices, and the last three presidents had considered, but passed over, Hispanic
candidates for the Court to the growing dissatisfaction of that growing electoral constituency.
Sotomayor’s personal narrative in some ways resembled Obama’s and the themes he emphasized
in his campaign and administration. Obama used the announcement of her nomination and the
ceremony celebrating her confirmation to echo those notes. Nominating Sotomayor allowed
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Obama to sound an appealing theme, please an important demographic group, and choose a
confirmable nominee whose selection would not interfere with other matters on the agenda.
The context had changed when Obama made his second nomination the following year.
The Sotomayor nomination had, of course, removed the pressure to name a Hispanic to the
Court. Obama’s approval rating had declined, his party had experienced some setbacks, and the
midterm election campaigns were well underway with the indicators trending against the
Democrats. Kagan, having served as Solicitor General for a year and a half and having argued
six times before the Court, was a more plausible candidate than the year before. Obama’s two
leading alternatives, Judges Diana Woods and Merrick Garland, seemed more likely to
antagonize the right or left respectively than did Kagan. Having nominated Sotomayor with his
first choice, he may have seen Kagan as the safest pick available to him. A relatively smooth
confirmation in an election year no doubt had some appeal. Finally, Kagan had a reputation for
working across the aisle. Obama may have thought she could appeal to one or more of the five
conservative members of the Court.
Obama was apparently not troubled by leaving the Court without a Protestant member or
without one who attended a law school other than Harvard, Yale or Columbia. Perhaps a
different president would have weighed those factors more heavily than did he. Perhaps they
will constrain the next Supreme Court nomination, whether made by Obama or his successor.
VI.

The Dynamic Nature of Supreme Court Selection

The discussion thus far has largely assumed that the period since 1900 provides data to
accurately portray Supreme Court selection as it now exists. This premise needs now to be
qualified. That period is valid to illustrate the three-variable taxonomy which did and does
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provide an analytical tool to assess presidential selection of Supreme Court nominees.
Moreover, many of the particular components of each variable apply. Even where some specific
considerations are now obsolete or nearly so, they often represent more general concepts. For
instance, presidents no longer emphasize geography or religion in choosing nominees yet those
anachronistic categories remind us that representation and diversity have long been a
consideration and are surrogates for their contemporary successor categories such as race, gender
and ethnicity. Similarly, future presidents obviously cannot appoint “firsts” from those groups
which have already provided justices but this motivation will presumably manifest itself with
respect to groups whose members have not yet served.
Yet presidential selection of Supreme Court nominees has not been a stable enterprise
since 1900. Although each president has exercised the same constitutional power, the
nomination process has changed in fundamental ways which have affected presidential
calculations. In addition to short-term contextual conditions, modern presidents act in a
different political universe than did their predecessors of a century or half-century ago. Some of
the discussion so far has hinted at some of these changes. It is useful now to focus on them.
First, the growth of the executive branch generally, and the White House staff
specifically, have provided presidents with greater resources to scrutinize Supreme Court
nominees. In the 19th and early 20th century, senators, cabinet members and certain justices often
significantly influenced nominations.

Relatively few participated in the selection process.266

Such figures sometimes still make a difference but their leverage has diminished as other players
have emerged. The justice department and White House have expanded since the New Deal,
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providing much greater capacity in the executive branch to evaluate and vet prospective
nominees. Although the development originally pulled the selection process towards the justice
department, the more recent growth of the White House staff in general, and of the White House
counsel in particular, have expanded presidential resources and drawn the process into the White
House. A tiny number of professionals worked in Franklin Roosevelt’s White House but by the
Nixon administration, the president could call upon White House attorneys as well as political
advisers in considering prospective nominees.267 The justice department or particular attorneys
general may still be involved, particularly those close to the president, but increasingly the White
House has played a large role.268 Recently, the Vice President’s office has played an important
role. Al Gore was part of the group which met with Clinton regarding his nominations.269 Dick
Cheney played a major role in screening Supreme Court nominees for George W. Bush.
Prospective candidates were interviewed at the Vice President’s residence in a process Cheney
directed.270 Vice President Joe Biden conducted separate interviews of those on Obama’s
shortlist.271
Second, since the 17th Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 1913, senators have
been elected by popular vote rather than by the state legislature.272 Accordingly, they are more
responsive to public opinion in their states and less susceptible to persuasion by home state
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legislators. Direct election of senators did not immediately emerge as an important influence on
Supreme Court selection. Instead, it assumed significance only later as other developments
made the process more publicly accessible.
Third, changes in senate procedure made the process much more transparent. Prior to
1929, most confirmations were conducted in secrecy. Special action was required to open the
proceedings. Such arrangements were made in 1916 for the Brandeis nomination but not on
most other occasions. Since 1929, hearings and floor debate have occurred in open settings.273
Even so, the senate often did not hold hearings or conducted perfunctory sessions. There were
no hearings to consider the nominations of Byrnes, Wiley Rutledge and Harold Burton in the
1940s and 1950s; the senate spent only one day and between 23 and 58 pages of hearings on the
nominations of Sherman Minton, Charles Whittaker, Byron “Whizzer” White and Fortas (1965).
Even the nominations of Warren Burger in 1969 and Harry Blackmun in 1970 required a single
day and only 116 and 134 pages respectively.274 The level of scrutiny changed dramatically with
the Bork confirmation which spanned 12 days of hearings and produced a transcript of 6,511
pages.275
Fourth, testimony by nominees is a relatively recent practice. Although Harlan Fiske
Stone became the first nominee to testify in 1925 (at his request to rebut charges against his
administration of the justice department) his appearance did not create a new expectation. The
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next six nominees did not appear; Felix Frankfurter testified, reluctantly, and at the request of the
senate subcommittee. Only two of the next 11 nominees testified. Beginning with John
Marshall Harlan’s nomination in 1955, every nominee has appeared (unless the nomination was
withdrawn before hearings were held).276
Fifth, technological change has dramatically altered the context in which nominees are
chosen. Hearings have been televised since 1981 and the presence of the cameras has changed
behavior and introduced new considerations.277 Presidents now have reason to weigh how a
nominee will come across in that medium. The television screen was not kind to Judge Robert
Bork, a factor which may have contributed to his defeat.278 By contrast, it may have helped John
Roberts, a photogenic nominee. Television and other electronic forms of disseminating
information make data, and rumors, about prospective and legal nominees more accessible. The
advent of cable news and the internet creates a continuous demand for news and a never ending
news cycle.279
Sixth, non-governmental groups have assumed an increased role in the process. The
American Bar Association has evaluated most nominees since 1954. Whereas interest groups
rarely participated in the confirmation process during the first half of the period, their
involvement is now commonplace. A variety of interest groups with competing agenda have
276

MALTESE, supra note 47, at 92–112.

277

See CARTER, supra note 3, at 16–18; DAVIS, supra note 21, at 15 (describing confirmation process now as
“media-oriented exercise”); GERHARDT, supra note 21, at 234–49; see also Lee Epstein, Jeffery A. Segal, Nancy
Staudt & Rene Lindstadt, Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145, 1151–52 (2005) (describing increase in print media attention to confirmations).
278

GREENBURG, supra note 40, at 51.

279

DAVID R. STRAS, Understanding The New Politics Of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1064-65
(2008) (describing increased role of media); YALOF, supra note 27, at 17.

84

sought to influence decisions regarding nomination and confirmation. This involvement, once
episodic, now is routine at all stages of the process.280 By nature, they are committed to
particular agendas and the objectives which animate their existence dwarf all other
considerations. They expect their allies in the senate to help them achieve their goals.281
Seventh, the greater appreciation that the Court plays a significant role on controversial
issues has increased the perceived stakes of nominations. Members of the public and interest
groups have intense feelings on hot button issues like abortion, same sex marriage, and
affirmative action which the Court decides or is likely to consider. The realization that the
Court will likely play a consequential role on such issues has drawn greater attention to
presidential choices282 and has raised the stakes for presidents and senators in selecting nominees
and deciding how to vote respectively.
Eighth, the Senate has become a more challenging body for presidential nominations due
to two additional changes. Cross-party control has become a more frequent reality. No president
submitted a nominee to a cross-party Senate from 1900 to 1954 (and cross-party control only
occurred during that time from 1947 to 1949). Since 1955, the Senate has been subject to cross-
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party control for 29 ½ of the 56 years. Five of the 11 presidents since then submitted 16 of the
33 nominees to a Senate the opposing party controlled.283
The challenge has been compounded more recently by the disappearance of the Senate’s
center. The demise of moderate Republicans and conservative Democrats has made it more
difficult for presidents to win cross-party votes for their nominees.
This latter development relates to the increased polarization of American politics.
Activists who vote in primaries tend to reflect the extremes of their parties, a development which
has contributed to the changes in the Senate and has reduced the availability of cross-party
nominees. Recent presidents have not considered such figures because few appealing such
candidates now exist.
Taken together, these developments have presented recent presidents with a different
reality when making nominations. The increasing frequency of divided control of the White
House and senate means that many presidents submit their nominees to a less receptive body, a
circumstance which itself presents a greater challenge.
Even under conditions of unified government, the president faces more intense
constraints. Nominations are now highly visible to the public. Nominees must now appear
before the Senate judiciary committee in televised proceedings. Modern media assures that
information and discussion regarding a Court nominee will be widely and continuously
disseminated. The president’s base and cross-party partisans are likely to care deeply about the
choice and assess the nominee based upon the perceived impact on high profile litmus test issues.
Interest groups will be intensely engaged because their constituents expect them to be.
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These factors motivate senators on each side to become engaged and to perceive
themselves as more accountable to their supporters. They recognize that their actions on Court
nominations are among their most visible public actions.284 The increased transparency limits
their flexibility, particularly if they plan to seek re-election and if their term expires soon. These
changes have transformed the stakes for senators in the process.
To be sure, the institutionalization of the executive branch and the White House gives the
president more tools to assess the merits of competing candidates and the implications of
different choices. Yet the advantage from this enhanced capacity, helpful though it is, does not
overcome the constraints these developments impose.
In response to these changes, the senate has provided a greater obstacle to presidential
nominations than was true earlier in the century.285 Dividing the period from 1900 roughly into
two halves (1900-1955, 1956-2011), illustrates that confirmation has recently been less certain
than was true during the first part of the period. Only one nomination was defeated during the
first half286 yet seven were unsuccessful during the more recent period.287 Even successful
nominees attract more opposition. During the first half, 32 of the 35 successful nominees (92%)
received at least 75% of the votes cast in the senate. During the second period, only 75% of
successful nominees achieved that threshold. Of the last four nominees, one was withdrawn and
the other three averaged 37 negative votes.
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In addition to confirmation becoming more precarious, the stakes for the president have
increased in another respect. Presidents know their nominees will be highly scrutinized by the
media, opposing interest groups and the senate. The increased visibility and interest means the
president is more likely to be measured by his choice of a Court nominee than was true a halfcentury ago. They will be affected not simply by whether a nominee is confirmed and how she
acts on the Court but by how a nominee is perceived during the process. Presidents want to name
justices whose appointments will reflect well on them, either to enhance their current political
standing or to contribute to their legacy, or both. Supreme Court nominations, more than
virtually any but the choice of a running mate send messages to officials, groups and citizens
about the president and his values. The increased visibility now presents more risk but also
greater opportunity for the president. He can exploit a nomination to enhance his own standing
with important constituencies or the public at large.288
Although presidents still operate within the same formal arrangements as did their
predecessors a century or half-century ago, the president now encounters a very different system.
The transformation has occurred through a series of informal changes in the operation of the
selection process. Most of the changes occurred independent of one another. Many--the
increased salience of issues on the Court’s docket, the polarization of politics, the change in
media--occurred entirely independent of the confirmation process.
In this respect, the change in the selection process of Supreme Court nominees mirrors
that in the selection of vice-presidential running mates during the latter half of the twentieth
century. There a range of informal changes in other institutions and in the larger society—the
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growth of the presidency, decline of party leaders, nationalization of politics, technological
change in media and air travel, and move to a presidential primary system—changed the
dynamics of running mate selection. Instead of party leaders engaging in ticket-balancing at the
convention with little input from the presidential nominee, the system came to be dominated by
the presidential candidate, removed from the convention and generally focused on the extent to
which a prospective nominee was nationally acceptable.289 Supreme Court selection, like the
choice of a running mate, has evolved in response to the changing political landscape in which
the decision is made.
As such, presidential selection of nominees for the Court presents yet another example of
the way in which constitutional institutions evolve even without formal change. Presidents act
differently in choosing Supreme Court nominees in response to the changed political landscape
in which the choice is made.
VII.

The Impact of the Changes

Although Supreme Court nominees remain the product of the interaction of pool, context
and idiosyncrasy the president faces new constraints. The increased transparency, visibility, and
acrimony of the process influence presidential decisions in multiple ways. In the relentlessly
unforgiving world of 24 hour cable news and internet, presidents have increased reason to
choose nominees who present themselves as plausible justices. Nominees with unimposing
credentials or modest aptitudes not only will provide wavering senators a reason to vote “no.”
They will also reflect badly on those who chose them. A nominee has to be able to vindicate
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himself or herself in televised hearings before the senate judiciary committee, a body which will
include some members who will be intent on embarrassing the witness and the president who
chose her. The nominee may be in the hot seat but the president who made the nomination is
also a target. The nominee’s vulnerabilities will be exploited to tarnish the president.
This changed context makes it more difficult to nominate those who are not well-versed
in high profile public law topics. Bush’s selection of Miers reveals the hazard of choosing
someone with modest credentials. Roughly three weeks after nominating Miers, Bush withdrew
her name after receiving advice from White House aides that her lack of knowledge would
prevent her from performing adequately at her hearings.290 Her weakness as a candidate would
provide opportunity for Bush’s critics to attack him, further compounding Bush’s growing
political weakness.291
Although these developments may provide incentive to avoid nominees whose
qualifications are lackluster, they also have less salutary consequences. They may also make it
difficult for presidents to choose those who have engendered controversy because they have
boldly explored new vistas in the law. Those with lengthy paper trails in the service of
controversial causes may seem unappealing nominees in our polarized political climate made
more so by an information age media which is structured to exacerbate differences. Presidents
may be inclined to avoid such candidates in favor of those whose views on litmus test issues are
more mysterious. A contemporary version of Brandeis, if such a figure can be imagined, may
present too great a risk for a modern president. A more cautious, less controversial candidate
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may seem the more prudent choice particularly for a president who faces other challenges and
does not want a contentious Court battle to divert resources from other priorities.
It is no coincidence that most recent nominees have been lower court judges. Although
the propensity of presidents to name judges has been exaggerated by focusing on those appointed
rather than first choices,292 presidents do often gravitate to judges for several reasons. A judicial
record may provide clues to judicial philosophy while insulating the jurist from the occasion to
expound on hot button topics. Prior confirmation suggests the judge has cleared a vetting hurdle
and may create a presumption in favor of approval. The title “Judge” provides an apparent
qualification even though the role of a Justice is different in critical respects. And judicial
experience may familiarize a judge with a wide range of doctrine so she can present herself as
knowledgeable during testimony.
Notwithstanding Kagan’s selection, the modern process may raise the risks of choosing
some administration insiders. So doing raises the possibility that unfriendly senators will use the
hearings to attack and discredit administration conduct, a concern which made Babbitt a costly
nominee for Clinton. Moreover, some senators may seek to uncover communications between
the President and the nominee, a strategy which complicated Miers’ nomination.
The modern process still involves an interaction between pool, context and presidential
idiosyncrasy but the developments outlined above tilt a president’s calculations differently than
in earlier times. Ideology is understood to be more important, confirmation more difficult, the
process far more transparent and contentious, all of which elevates the risks to the president.
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These changes decrease the likelihood presidents will choose cronies or lackluster candidates.
They also diminish the chance they will nominate a Brandeis, a Cardozo, a Warren or a Hughes.
They seem to promote the likelihood that presidents will more often seek federal judges than
those whose primary career work has been in elected or high-level appointed positions.
VIII.

Conclusion

Of course, presidents want to appoint ideologically compatible nominees, they want their
choices to be confirmed and occasionally they must strike accommodations between these two
goals. Yet these are not their only objectives in choosing nominees. Presidents also want to
protect and improve their own public stature, to avoid jeopardizing other aspects of their
program, and to respond to demands of important demographic groups. These considerations
may compete and may weigh differently for different presidents and at different times.
Ultimately, future, like past, choices will turn on the interaction of pool, context and
selector. In all likelihood, presidents will nominate able lawyers whose philosophies they find
congenial, who they deem confirmable and whose selections they think will reflect well on them.
Beyond that, each president will weigh differently a range of considerations based upon the
options he has, the constraints he perceives, and the distinctive mix of attributes he brings to the
decision. Those collective calculations of a number of presidents will largely determine the
composition of the Court which interprets the Constitution.
The new regime seems likely to encourage the appointment of able justices. It is less
clear that it will produce those with political skill. Ironically, in an age in which the Court’s
work is increasingly seen as political, relevant and controversial, those appointed increasingly
seem unschooled (and often uninterested) in important political arts such as compromise and
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anticipating the societal impact of alternative choices. That development has resulted from the
way the system of selecting nominees has responded to societal changes. It is a byproduct worth
watching, and remedying.
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